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BUT DID THEY LISTEN?
THE NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY
COMMISSION'S EXERCISE IN
ABOLITIONISM: A REPLY
Robert Blecker1

INTRODUCTION
On January 2, 2007, the New Jersey Death Penalty Study
Commission, with one dissenting vote, declared itself "pleased"
to submit its report and recommendations to the Governor. 2
The Commission had reached consensus: The legislature should
simply abolish the death penalty and substitute life without
parole.3
Although they personally supported capital
punishment, some Commissioners voted to abolish it,
despairing that the state's "liberal" Supreme Court would never

Robert Blecker, a graduate of Harvard Law School (1974) and a Harvard
University Fellow in Law and Humanities (1976-1977), teaches Criminal Law;
Constitutional History; and the Death Penalty at New York Law School.
1

2 N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM'N REPORT (2007) [hereinafter COMM'N
REPORT] (introductory letter from Chairman Rev. M. William Howard, Jr.),
available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf (last
visited Oct. 31, 2007).

3 Id.

at 1-2, 8.
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allow an execution to take place. 4 Why dangle false hope before
irate and grieving victims' families?s
The Commission majority, however, probably concluded, as
it began, with an abiding conviction that capital punishment
violated human dignity.
Legislation establishing the Commission had directed it to
"study all aspects of the death penalty" - a literally impossible
task. 6 During five public hearings, a parade of witnesses - some
invited legal experts or religious leaders, others family members
of the slain - exposed weaknesses and problems with the
(non)administration of the death penalty and mostly rebutted
an occasional advocate who did defend the punishment orally
and in writing.7
"The people of the State of New Jersey have been greatly
served," the Chair declared in the final report, sending the
Legislature and Governor the near unanimous proposal to
abolish capital punishment. 8 The Commission, he assured the
public, had "shown respectful regard for the differing
perspectives that exist."9
But had it? We who feel certain that justice demands the
death of a mass murdering child rapist did not feel respectfully
regarded.
The Chair, Reverend William Howard, other
members of the Commission and staff were gracious, helpful
and polite, even in disagreement, welcoming retributivist
advocates to speak and submit written statements. 10 And the
official transcript of the hearings does record our testimony. 11
Yet reviewing the Commission report and its recommendations
4 Id. at 94 (statement of Kathleen Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study
Comm'n).

5

Id. at 93-96.

6

S. 709, 211th Leg., 321 (N.J. 2006).

7

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-20.

8

Id. at Statement from the Chairman.

9Id.
10

See, e.g., id. at 27-51 (statement of R. Erik Lillquist).

11

Id. at 29.
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can't help but make us wonder: Although we spoke and wrote,
did they listen?
Locally and internationally hailed as comprehensive and
complete, 12 on many essential issues, the Commission's final
report fails to engage the complexity of the great debate.
Unbalanced and biased, it does not even mention any
alternative to abolition or standing pat.
Now, immediately following the fall 2007 elections, under
cover of the Commission's recommendation and report, New
Jersey stands poised to become the first state in the modern era
legislatively to abolish the death penalty. Other states may
follow that lead. Some state legislatures might even reflect
popular will and restore it. Abolish or retain the death penalty,
the People's representatives should balance the equities and
focus firmly on the most essential issue which the Commission
avoided: Justice. This witness repeatedly attempted without
much effect, through personal appearance and written
submission and follow-up, to inform the Commission. 13 An
abiding conviction that the people would have their legislature
focus where the Commission failed, and a continuing
commitment to justice after a better informed debate compels
this counter-report.

THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS
Responding to seven specific questions from the
legislature,14 the Commission based its final recommendation to
abolish the death penalty on seven specific findings, and added
an eighth of its own. 1s
Let's take them one by one.
Schwaneberg, Robert, Panel Calls for a Ban on NJ Executions: Corzine,
Top Legislators BackLife w/o Parole, STAR LEDGER, Jan. 3, 2007.
12

13 Public Hearing Before the N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 55 (Oct. 11,
2006) [hereinafter Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006] (testimony of Robert Blecker),
at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/DPSC
available
101106.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
1

4

15

S. 709, 211th Leg., 32i. (N.J. 2006).
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
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FINDING (1) THERE IS NO COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT
THE NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY RATIONALLY SERVES A
LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL INTENT. 1 6

The Commission's first finding incorporated the legislature's
awkwardly phrased question, but with a twist. 1 7 What is a
"legitimate penological intent?" Penological "intent" must
mean - "purpose," "goal," or "justification." Traditionally,
punishment serves as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and/or a method to express social solidarity. 18

Rehabilitation
Of course death, an irreversible extinction, cannot
rehabilitate a person in this world. Some religious outlooks
historically and today may see death as expiation, allowing the
murderer to pay the price here and prepare to enter the
Everlasting with a clean slate. The Commission well avoided
this theological thicket. A secular society constitutionally
committed to separating religion and law must assume death
does not rehabilitate those we legally execute.
Relative isolation of death-row, however, might encourage
the Condemned to contemplate their crimes, take responsibility,
allowing them to grow remorseful and humane, whereas life in
general population might undermine that growth, forcing
prisoners into self-protection, and promotion of prison schemes
to survive and thrive. Again, rightly, the Commission did not
address this. For the Commission's purposes, and ours here, the
death penalty cannot be justified as rehabilitation.

Incapacitation
Executed murderers, of course, will never kill again. If
instead we imprison them for life without parole, they may kill
fellow prisoners, or staff. Still, we cannot justify taking
prisoners' lives solely because we cannot safely confine them.
16

Id. at 24.

1

Id. at 4.

7

18

Id. at 1, 24.
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We can and we should design and administer prisons to keep us
safe from the prisoners we confine. Incapacitation alone cannot
justify the death penalty.

Deterrence
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the death penalty
must either generally deter or serve retributive ends. 1 9 Although
"deterrence" was the sole "penological intent" specifically listed
by the New Jersey state legislature,2° polls show that the
American majority who support the death penalty (and
probably, too, most of those who oppose it) do not find
deterrence their primary issue. 21
In essays and repeatedly in testimony before the
Commission, abolitionists flatly insisted that the death penalty
"really has no general deterrent effect", characterizing
arguments supporting deterrence as "totally implausible" 22 and
"not empirically supportable." 2 3 "It's clear that the death
penalty has never been a deterrent." 2 4 At one public hearing,
the Commission's lone dissenter momentarily joined his
opponents and stretched their attack beyond reason: "I don't
believe any penalty is a deterrent." 2 s
9 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 233 (1976).
1

20

S. 709, 211th Leg., 321 (N.J. 2006).

21

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.

22
See, e.g., COMM'N MEETINGS OF N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM'N 9
(Aug. 16, 2006) [hereinafter COMM'N MEETINGS] (testimony of J. John J.
Gibbons), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/
DPSC081606.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).

23

Id. at 11.

2 4 Public Hearing Before the N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 9 (Sept. 13,
2006) [hereinafter Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006] (testimony of N.J. Sen.
Raymond J. Lesniak), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub
/pubhear/DPSC091306.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).

s Id. at 130 (testimony of John F. Russo, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study
Comm'n).
2
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Those death penalty opponents - abolitionists who make the
patently ridiculous claim that "the death penalty simply does not
deter anybody" - unnecessarily make their own position more
difficult. Of course the death penalty deters some people. As
the Royal Commission (1949-1953) observed in its lengthy and
detailed report, "We can number its failures. But we cannot
number its successes." 26 We can never know how many people
who would have otherwise committed murder stopped
themselves because, and only because of the threat of
punishment. 2 7
The deterrence question, really, is not whether the death
penalty deters - sometimes it surely does -- but whether, on
balance, it deters more effectively than its principal alternative,
life (without parole). Better informed abolitionists, then, make
the more modest claim that the death penalty no more
powerfully deters than life in prison. They claim that studies
either confirm this failure of deterrence, or at least fail to
establish the death penalty's marginally more powerful
deterrent effect. 2 s
During their hearings, the Commission did focus on
deterrence. 2 9 This much was common ground among the real
experts: Several recent sophisticated studies seem to confirm a
substantially greater deterrent effect of the death penalty - but
only when used regularly.3° Critics attacked these studies at the
hearings.3 1 The Commission report relied on Columbia Law
School Professor Jeffrey Fagan's skillful and relentless critique,
diminishing the studies' persuasive power.3 2

2

6 ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT, 1953, [Crud.

8932],

at 20 [hereinafter ROYAL COMM'N].

27

Id.

28

COMM'N REPORT,

2

Id. at 24-29.

9

supra note 1, at 24-26.

3o

Id. at 27.

31

See, e.g., id. at 26.

32Id.
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For example, all but one of the studies group all types of
murder together, claiming that all are equally deterred by the
death penalty. However, many murders are not planned in
advance but are committed impulsively or in a sudden outburst
of rage. It is not logical, according to Professor Fagan, to believe
that such defendants would respond rationally to threats of
punishment. 33
Murderers largely moved by momentary passion, the
argument goes, give little thought to the consequences as they
kill.34 The very remote possibility of their own execution
someday in the distant future cannot and does not stop them
here and now.35
In 1999, however, when the New Jersey legislature amended
the statute, adding the "violation of domestic violence
restraining order" as an aggravating circumstance making the
intentional killer death eligible,36 legislators must have believed
that the remote threat of death could restrain passionate
homicidal impulses of rejected lovers where court-issued
restraining orders failed. Perhaps the legislature's "penological
intent" was retribution and not deterrence. Perhaps they added
this aggravator because in their view - although not in mine those who disobey court orders and kill shall die.37
Many undeterrable passion killings qualify as manslaughter
but not murder. And only the very worst passion murderers such as sadistic torture killers - deserve to die. For centuries
we've believed, all other things equal, premeditated coldblooded killings deserve greater punishment than passion
killing. And although certain murderers - international or
domestic terrorists who kill in order to achieve a martyr's death
- are by definition undeterrable, other cold blooded killers, e.g.
professional assassins, may be most deterrable and also deserve
to die.
33Id. at 25.
34Id.
35

Id. at 24-25.

36

S. 947, 208th Leg., 2090). (N.J. 1999).

37

Id.
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Early deterrence advocates such as Jeremy Bentham
portrayed human beings as rational and calculating, weighing
costs against benefits, discounting future threats of pain by their
uncertainty and delay.38 Thus, as the NJ Commission Report
emphasized, since "less than 1 percent of those who commit
murder nationwide ultimately receive the death penalty and less
than one-half of that small number are executed," the death
penalty could not be expected to deter a would-be murderer who
rationally considered the odds.39
But this ignores basic human nature: When it comes to
dying, most people, except extreme action seekers, go to great
lengths to avoid deadly risks. We willingly sacrifice near-certain
pleasure to spare ourselves remote risks of disaster. There is
nothing "irrational" about this. Nor, flipping it, do we act
irrationally in making small but certain sacrifices in order to
achieve remotely possible future rewards - buying a lottery
ticket for $1 although the chances are one in a hundred million
of winning $20 million.
Classically, punishment's effectiveness as a deterrent
depends, in Bentham's words, not only upon its certainty, but
also its celerity.4° Thus the Commission also noted that, "as a
practical matter, the length of time that convicted murderers ...
serve on death row argues against the usefulness of the death
penalty as a deterrent."4 1 In the tradition of Bentham, the
Commission saw potential killers as either passionate and
unrestrainable, or rational and dismissing as tiny any possibility
of being put to death.4 2
Punishment, however, as the Royal Commission noted, may
restrain human beings subconsciously.43 "[T]he deterrent force
of capital punishment operates not only by affecting the
38 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 326 (C.K

Hildreth trans., Morrison and Gibb Ltd. 1950) (1864).
39 COMM'N REPORT,

4° BENTHAM,

supra note 1, at 24.

supra note 38, at 326.

4 1 COMM'N REPORT,

supra note 1, at 29.

42Jd.
43 ROYAL COMM'N,

supra note 26, at 20.

Ogden ed., Richard
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conscious thoughts of individuals tempted to commit murder,
but also by building up in the community, over a long period of
time, a deep feeling of peculiar abhorrence for the crime of
murder."44
Abolitionists counter with the death penalty's so-called
"brutalization effect":
Condemning to death, then killing
helpless defendants, the Government subconsciously reinforces
a belief in all potential killers that killing is alright. 45 While the
Commission expounded on this highly speculative subconscious
brutalization hypothesis,46 it completely ignored subconscious
forces supporting deterrence cited by the British Commission47
which this witness personally brought to their attention. 48
Instead, determined to marshal evidence against capital
punishment, the Commission report cited Richard Dieter for the
well-known but misleading observation that "states without a
death penalty have far lower murder rates than the states with
the death penalty."49 Of course, Washington D.C., with its own
criminal code and prison system, but without a death penalty,
has had a much higher murder rate than neighboring Virginia or
Maryland, both capital jurisdictions.so The abolitionist spin can
omit this fact, however, because D.C. is a "district" and not a
state. Furthermore, comparing counties within a state, the
effective unit of death penalty prosecution, the death penalty's
marginal deterrent effect increases.s1 But, again, conveniently
44Jd.
45

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.

46Jd.
47

ROYAL COMM'N, supra note 26, at 20.

4 8 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 50 (testimony of Robert
Blecker).
49

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.

5o DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2005 (2006) (these statistics are based on both murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius
/data/table_o5.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 42-44 (quoting Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11,
2006, supra note 13, at 9-11) (Oct. 11, 2007) (testimony of J. David S. Baime).
51
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neither the Executive Director of the abolitionist Death Penalty
Information Center nor the similarly abolitionist Commission
chose to mention this inconvenient fact.
And if they were really about max1m1zmg capital
punishment's deterrent effect, confining themselves to rational,
conscious decision-making, the Commission might have
proposed refining and narrowing the death penalty to the worst
of the worst, and thereafter more regularly seeking and applying
it to a much smaller class of monsters.s 2 This witness urged the
Commission orally and in writing to do this, providing a
blueprint for a morally refined death penalty regime.s3 The
Newark Star-Ledger headlined and highlighted that testimony
- "Prof wants execution saved for 'the worst of the worst'."s4
Bent on abolitionism, the Commission completely ignored the
plea. Instead, sandwiched between sustained scholarly attacks
on deterrence the Commission did quote Kent Scheidegger, a
leading death penalty supporter and legal director of the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.ss The death penalty "'does
have a deterrent effect and does save innocent lives if it is
actually enforced'," Scheidegger observed.s6 But "New Jersey
does not have an effective death penalty because our 'court of
last resort is determined to block it and willing to twist the law
to do so'."s7
The Commission report did not cite Scheidegger's specific
examples of blatant judicial abolitionism cloaked as analysis.ss
52 Robert Blecker, A Road Not Considered, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
(forthcoming 2008).

53 Pub. Hearing, Oct.
Blecker).

11,

2006, supra note 13, at 50 (testimony of Robert

54 Robert Schwaneberg, Prof Wants Execution Saved for 'the Worst of the
Worst', NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 12, 2006, at 37.

55

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58 Public Hearing Before the N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 8-9 (Oct.
25, 2006) [hereinafter Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006] (testimony of Kent
available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/
Scheidegger),
pubhear/DPSC102506.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
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Nor did it wonder aloud how this state's first twenty-eight death
sentences could have been so defective that the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed each of them. The Commission's
abolitionist majority would hardly criticize their comrades on
the Court for subverting the will of the people. Instead the
Report uses Scheidegger to concede that in New Jersey the
numbers were too scant and condemnations too rare to
conclude anything much on behalf of deterrence.s9
So, although the latest, most recent, most sophisticated
studies do suggest that on balance, a death penalty regularly
administered, more effectively deters murder than does life
without parole, suppose we join the Commission in putting
these studies aside.
Assume that collectively without more, the data to this point
fails to clearly and convincingly prove the death penalty
operates as a marginally more effective deterrent than life in
prison. What else could support or supplant this latest but not
yet conclusive empirical evidence? We're thrown back to human
nature - "our hunches about how humans behave," which even
in the light of the attack on deterrence, "remain, for now,
untouched," testified Professor Lillquist, an agnostic on the
death penalty.6°
This "commonsense argument from human nature,
applicable particularly to certain kinds of murders and certain
kinds of murderers" strongly suggests that threatened death
generally deters better than threatened life.6 1
"No other punishment deters men so effectually from
committing crimes as the punishment of death," observed Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen, the great 19th century English judge
and leading historian of the criminal law.
This is one of those propositions which it is
difficult to prove, simply because they are in
themselves more obvious than any proof can make
them. It is possible to display ingenuity in arguing
against it, but that is all. The whole experience of
mankind is in the other direction . . . 'All that a
59 COMM'N REPORT,

supra note 1, at 27.

6o

COMM'N MEETINGS,

6l

ROYAL COMM'N,

supra note 22, at 35.

supra note 26, at 19.
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man has will he give for his life.' In any secondary
punishment, however terrible, there is hope; [b]ut
death is death. 62
My years interviewing street killers inside maximum security
prisons and on death rows confirm this, exploding the
categorical myth that the death penalty never deters more
effectively than life without parole. My oral testimony informed
the Committee about "Joe,'' who specialized in robbing drug
dealers in the D.C. area. While robbing a middle-level dealer in
his house in Virginia, Joe and his partners discovered to their
delight in addition to cocaine, their robbery victims also
possessed kilos of heroin. Joe told his cohort to wait outside
while he dealt with his victims, already tied up and duct taped.
Joe had decided to kill them, he recalled. But at the last
moment he changed his mind. Why had he let them live?
"When I was doing time in Richmond, I used to see the electric
chair when I swept the hall. And what flashed in my mind was
that chair, and I didn't want that. I couldn't handle that. So I let
them live."63
This only shows how the death penalty deterred this one
killer at this one moment. It does not demonstrate the more
important point that sometimes only the death penalty can
deter where life in prison will not. But Joe continued, telling me
of a similar situation in Washington, D.C., which does not have
the death penalty. "What did you do?" He said matter-of-factly,
"I killed them. Because I could face life inside this joint. I had
done time here before, and I knew I could do it again. But that
chair, man. That's something else."64
Of course this is but one anecdote - although the most direct
kind of evidence on deterrence we can ever hope to have. But
why should we consider it freakish? Other stories in the
literature and my own interviews confirm it. For most people -and especially for those who have already served time in prison

62 Id. at 753 (citing James Fitzjames Stephen, Capital Punishments,
FRASER'S MAGAZINE, June 1864).
63

Interview with "Joe," prisoner in the Lorton Central Prison in
Washington, D.C.
64Jd.

Fall2007

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 5:1

and do not fear repeating that experience - only the threat of
death, and sometimes not even that, will restrain them.
This witness drew the Commission's attention to these
anecdotes, to the British Commission report, a model of fairness
and depth the Commission could have tried to emulate. He
drew their attention to Fitzjames Stephen's observations on
human nature, which the Commission conveniently avoided
mentioning in its final report, perhaps because these truisms are
so difficult to rebut. 65
Instead, moved by Professor Fagan's scholarly critique, the
Commission dismissed "a sea change in the scholarship on
deterrence and the death penalty" as Scheiddeger called it,
where "improved methods of econometrics" by and large
"confirms what common sense has always told us."66
How to resolve the conflict among studies, undermined by
data too sparse statistically to make the case for or against
deterrence?
Absent overwhelming statistical proof, it might seem that
commonsense and human nature would decide this issue. But
not for this Commission, determined at the outset to abolish the
death penalty: "Given the plethora of scientific analysis,
'common-sense' explanations of the penalty's deterrent effect
based on logic ... are neither persuasive nor important." 67
When should logic, human nature and commonsense count?
When all the evidence is to the contrary? Or never at all? If not
here, where empirical studies apparently conflict, when would
the Commission count logic, human nature and common sense?
In the end, regardless of the Commission's unsupported
assertion, commonsense, human nature, logic, and anecdote
strongly support what the most recent statistical studies suggest
- death generally deters more effectively than life.
Deterrence alone, however, should rarely if ever justify death
as punishment.

65

Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 37.

66

Pub. Hearing, Oct.

6 7 COMM'N REPORT,

25, 2006,

supra note 58, at 5.

supra note 1, at 28 (emphasis added).
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Retribution

However repulsive to a majority of the Commission, 68
retribution remains the primary justification for the death
penalty, the primary "penological intent." Rejected by most
professors these past few decades, retribution -- literally "pay
back" -- persists as punishment's essential justification and
limit. Retributivists refuse to condemn and execute a helpless
person simply to terrify others. We retributivists would only
execute a person who deserves to die.
Retribution could have split the Commission between
abolitionists who detested the death penalty and those like
Commissioner Kathleen Garcia who wanted executions badly
but despaired that they would ever happen. 6 9 If the New Jersey
Supreme Court would forever block the death penalty, then why
force victims' families to have their deep wounds periodically
picked open by the endless legal process?
The Commission should have seriously considered whether
retributive justice ever demands death.
Instead, the
Commission barely acknowledged the retributive lens and never
employed it, or rebutted those of us who would.
But the
Commission cannot avoid retribution and still fulfill its
legislated mandate. It cannot avoid retribution and serve the
public good.
All seven questions the legislature put to the Commission7°
really implicate retribution directly or indirectly (metaphorically
in the case of "costs"). Four of the Commission's eight findings
involve retribution essentially:
"(1) There is no compelling evidence that the New Jersey
death penalty rationally serves a legitimate penological
intent."7 1

68

Id. at 30.

6 9 See id.; Id. at 93-96 (statement of Kathleen Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death
Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring).

7°

S. 709, 211th Leg., 32i. (N.J. 2006).

71

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added).
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"(5) Abolition of the death penalty will eliminate the risk of

disproportionality in capital sentencing ."72
"(6) The penological interest in executing a small number of
persons guilty of murder is not sufficiently compelling to justify
the risk of making an irreversible mistake."73
"(7) The alternative of life imprisonment in a maximum
security institution without the possibility of parole would
sufficiently ensure public safety and address other legitimate
social and penological interests, including the interests of the
families of murder victims."74

Instead of really focusing on retribution and allowing its
great weight throughout, however, the Commission report
handled retribution quickly up front right after deterrence,
acknowledged an internal split among Commissioners,75 and
delicately mostly avoided it thereafter. As we'll see, when the
Commission report reached questions 5, 6, & 7
disproportionality, the penological interest in executing the
worst of the worst, and the moral sufficiency of life without
parole-- they avoided the question of justice. By disallowing
retribution to act as a counterweight, the Commission could
assume their conclusions, avoid difficult balancing, and simply
call for abolition.
Early witnesses disparaged retributive support for the death
penalty as vestigial hypocrisy.
We "debase and degrade
ourselves by resorting to the same conduct that we condemn for
those who kill."7 6 "Killing because someone else has killed" was
not "consistent with ... the mores of a civilized society."77 "We
72Jd.
73Jd.
74Jd.
75

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30.

Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 116 (testimony of Dan
Carluccio).
76

77 Id.

at 46 (testimony of Robert Del Tufo).
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cannot teach respect for life by taking life."78 But this well-worn
argument -- that we debase life by taking life -- if it proves
anything, proves too much. When we imprison kidnappers, do
we thereby debase liberty, this witness asked rhetorically, in
writing and oral testimony before the Commission ?79 When we
impose fines on thieves, do we debase property? Punishment
acts as a like kind response - inflicting justified pain upon a
person who earlier inflicted unjustified pain (so, too, of course
celebration - returning pleasure for past pleasure). Thus the
basic retributive measure - like for like - "as he has done, so
shall it be done to him;"8o "giving a person a taste of her own
medicine;" "fighting fire with fire" - satisfies at a primal level.
Reciprocity is not hypocrisy.
During the hearings, Judge John Gibbons (and other critics)
disparaged retribution as "atavistic" and a "synonym" for
"vengeance."8 1 Apparently our earlier public debate, sponsored
by the New Jersey League of Women Voters, failed to enlighten
the former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit, an ardent
abolitionist, as he once again conflated retribution with
vengeance or revenge.
"Those who insist on equating retribution with revenge" this
witness countered at length in his twenty minutes before the
Commission, must:
recognize [deterrence] for what [it] is. Because if
retribution is pure revenge, then deterrence is
pure terrorism, as Hobbes - the first and greatest
modern utilitarian
said in disparaging
retribution and proposing deterrence. He said,
"The aym of punishment is not revenge, it's
terror." Now, we've come to appreciate that

78 Public Hearing Before the N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 5 (July 19,
2006) [hereinafter Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006] available at
http:/ /www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/DPSC071906. pdf (citing
Bishop John M. Smith) Oast visited Nov. 8, 2007).

2006, supra note 13, at 35.

79

Pub. Hearing, Oct.

80

Leviticus 24:19.

Bl

COMM'N MEETINGS, supra note 20, at 11.

11,
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deterrence is not pure terror. You should also
appreciate that retribution is not pure revenge. 82
Although they stem from a common desire to inflict pain on
the source of pain, revenge may be limitless and misdirected at
the undeserving, as with collective punishment. Retribution,
however, must be limited and proportional - no more (or less)
than what's deserved, this witness further protested. 83
"[R]etribution provides the basis for limiting punishment as
well as for affirming it," he insisted in his oral testimony before
the Commission. "We, as advocates of the death penalty, are as
concerned that those who do not deserve it do not get it, as we
are that those who do, do."84
The Commission's final report, to its credit, did not repeat
abolitionists' false equation of retribution and revenge, citing me
instead and supposedly recounting my rejoinder:
Professor Blecker stated that retribution should
not be equated with revenge, which is not
proportional and is unlimited. Rather, he said,
retribution is proportional to the crime of murder.
Retribution is based on the principle of lex
talionis, or "an eye for an eye" - the belief that
punishment should fit the crime. 85
But this retributivist never actually said or implied that
"retribution is proportional to murder." Literally non-sensical,
the Commission's restatement badly distorts my position
repeatedly expressed: Murder only rarely calls for the death
penalty. Pennsylvania was first explicitly to recognize this in
1794, splitting off 1st degree capital murder from other murder. 86
And the U.S. Supreme Court has held for decades, the death
penalty may not be used for the vast majority of murders. 87
s2 Pub. Hearing, Oct.
8 3Jd.

11,

2006, supra note 13, at 36.

at 34.

84Jd.
85

COMM'N REPORT, supra

note 1, at 29-30.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 336 n.55 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
86

87

Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Death is a wildly disproportionate response for felony murder
where there is neither an intent to kill nor reckless disregard for
human life.ss
The Commission's unfortunate mischaracterization of
retribution probably unintentionally stemmed from its desire to
pass retribution by quickly and the Commission's failure to
grasp this concept so alien to it yet central to the vast majority of
the American public.
Let's get the record straight. Revenge may be a potentially
unlimited disproportional response. Retribution demands a
proportionate limited response. But at least the Commission
here seemed to understand that the proportionality question
could not be answered without considering retribution directly.
Except when the Commission did specifically arrive at the
question of proportionality, its report somehow virtually ignored
retribution. s9
Abolitionists who reject retribution -- who do not feel the
urge to punish, or do feel it but suppress that feeling of
righteous indignation as irrational and shameful -- cannot really
grasp what moves us retributivists.
Retribution itself remains a complex doctrine. Retributivists
split into different camps, disagreeing among themselves about
the calculus of desert. Immanuel Kant, perhaps the best known
retributivist, would count only the killer's intent or motive,
holding that the only pure evil is an evil will. 9o Most
retributivists, however, also factor in the actual harm willingly
caused. All other things equal, murder is worse than attempted
murder, and thus deserves greater punishment. In common,
retributivists refuse to justify punishment by its future costs or
benefits, resting justice -- limited, proportional punishment exclusively on a criminal's past moral culpability.
Most retributive death penalty supporters, then, define the
"worst of the worst" as deserving to die for the extreme harms
they cause (rape-murder, mass-murder, child- murder, torture88

See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.

137 (1987).
89

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30.

9o IMMANUEL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 84 (William Hastie trans., Alex
Catalogue of Electronic Texts) (1790).
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murder) along with the attitude with which they cause it sadistically or with a depraved callousness.
According to Immanuel Kant's classic retributivism, we
impose punishment as an abstract duty without any emotion.
By punishing, we dignify the transgressor, acknowledging the
free will that produced the crime. The murderer must die; Kant
insists, "his death, however, must be kept free from all
maltreatment." Kant rejects offering the condemned an option
to submit to dangerous medical experiments on condition that
his life be spared if he survives, insisting that we always treat
human beings as ends in themselves, and never merely as a
means to our ends.9 1
Following Kant's lead, again,
contemporary retributivists reject general deterrence as an
insufficient justification for punishment, especially death otherwise we would be making an example of a person, in order
to change others' future behavior.
More persistent and popular than Kant's retributivism from
an abstract sense of duty, emotive/intuitive retributivism has
deeper roots.
Abolitionists in the hearings consistently disparaged
emotion: "We know that the death penalty is mostly an
emotional response to heinous acts,''9 2 and "[a]n emotional
response not based on reason."93 Although we may try to avoid
it, however, emotion has always played a vital part in moving us
to respond correctly.
"The voice of your brother's blood cries out to me from the
ground,'' Genesis proclaims. 94 In other words, blood pollutes
the land. Like the ancient Greeks and ancient Hebrews,
contemporary emotive retributivists feel polluted if vicious
murderers walk free, or frolic in confinement, failing to get their
just deserts.
Abolitionist critics of retribution insisted at the hearings that
emotion may never properly move us individually or
collectively:
91Jd.
92

Pub. Hearing, Sept.

93Jd.
94

Genesis 4:10.

13, 2006,

supra note 24, at 112-13.
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My heart goes out to every family devastated by
the murder of a loved one. They have every right
to be angry and to express that anger. But I'm
certain that deep down not one of them would
want to act out of that anger. As a society, we
should not act out of anger either,95
Senator Lesniak flatly asserted.
Emotive retributivists' urge to punish, however, stems
directly from a projected empathy with the victim's suffering.
"Our heart, as it adopts and beats time to his grief," declared
Adam Smith in A Theory of Moral Sentiments, the first great
work of modern retributive psychology, "so is it likewise
animated with that spirit ... to drive away or destroy the cause of
it."96 Haunted by the victim's suffering, retributive death
penalty supporters cannot forget or forgive the victim's fate:
"We feel that resentment which we imagine he ought to feel, and
which he would feel if in his cold and lifeless body there
remained any consciousness of what passes upon earth," Smith
further explained.97 "His blood ... calls aloud".98
Embracing human dignity as our primary value, emotive
retributivists since Adam Smith emphasize "a humanity that is
more generous and comprehensive," "oppos[ing] to the
emotions of compassion which [we] feel for a particular person,
a more enlarged compassion which [we] feel for mankind."99
This witness urged these feelings upon the Commission in
writing and oral testimony. 100 The Commission report, however
completely ignored emotive retributivism, instead drawing
summarily upon the testimony of Professor Lillquist, a
professed agnostic on the death penalty: "The retributivist
viewpoint is in accordance with the philosophy of Immanuel
9sid. at 6.
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 98-99 (Augustus M.

96

Kelley 1966) (1759).
97

Id.

98Id.
99

Id. at 128.

100

Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 34, 36.
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Kant that, for the most heinous forms of wrongdoing, the
penalty of death is morally justified or perhaps even
required. "101
Treating retributivism as a monolith - as duty stripped of
emotion -- allowed the Commission to expropriate emotion
when useful.
Thus the Commission could express its
understanding and sympathy for victims' families who had
allowed their own fury at their loved ones' killers to get the best
of them. And the Commission could display sensitivity to and
solidarity with the emotional rollercoaster ride a death penalty
never actually administered forced upon the victims' families, by
calling for the abolition of the only hope these families had of
ever seeing justice done.
Up front before they buried it, the Commission's final report
treated retribution - poison to some of the commissioners respectfully if gingerly, declining to repeat witnesses' silly,
specious claims of retributive hypocrisy, or the misleading
equation of retribution with vengeance. 102 Instead here, and
only in this part, did the report quote me. "In the words of
Professor Blecker: 'Naturally grateful, we reward those who
bring us pleasure. Instinctively resentful, we punish those who
cause us pain. Retributively, society intentionally inflicts pain
and suffering on criminals because and to the extent that they
deserve it. But only to the extent they deserve it ... Justice, a
moral imperative in itself, requires deserved punishment'." 103

101

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.

See, e.g., Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 112 (testimony
of Dan Carluccio).
102

10 3

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
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WHOSE BURDEN?

By its cleverly worded first finding - "there is no compelling
evidence that the New Jersey death penalty rationally serves a
legitimate penological intent" 10 4 - the Commission effectively
shifted the burden of persuasion upon those who would retain
the present statute rather than upon those who would change
the law.
The burden, however, should be on those who insist that the
death penalty always undermines the retributive goal of justice.
If the Commission had really faced the retributive question, and
placed the burden where it should lie, abolitionists on the
Commission would have felt called upon to establish that life
without parole and not death gives the most heinous killers
their just deserts. Instead, rejecting retribution as repulsive and
the death penalty as immoral, the Commission majority simply
begged the question and shifted the burden. 10s
Suppose the obvious: Retributively, death is not always a
grossly disproportionate response. Complex questions remain.
Does death and death alone uniquely qualify as justice? And
even then, where death is the only just punishment, do practical
concerns of efficiency and policy trump retributive justice? The
Commission should have focused upon these questions in its
later findings. Instead, the Commission cleverly phrased its first
finding to place the burden of persuasion on those who insist
that justice sometimes demands death. So we have the burden,
yet the Commission excludes most of our case.
And what a strange burden the Commission imposes upon
us. We would shoulder it. "Compelling evidence" - evidence
which compels us to demand the death penalty: "The voice of
our brother's blood;" 106 "like members of the same body, [we]

10 4

Id. at 1.

105Jd.
106

Genesis 4:10.
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should feel and resent each other's injuries;" 107 "it [is] highly
desirable that criminals should be hated." 108
It is ironic, if not hypocritical, for the Commission to impose
this "compelling" emotional burden upon retributive death
penalty advocates while allowing retribution, if at all, only as
strictly rational and non-emotive.
How could Commission members, never so much as
acknowledging emotive retributivism which does distinguish
emotion from abstract duty, ever be "compelled" by it?
Contemporary utilitarians declare it irrational to cry over spilt
blood. Punishment for the sake of the past seems pointless to
them - "what good will it do to inflict more pain?" Of course we
retributivists reply that Justice, a moral imperative in itself,
requires deserved punishment. Again, emotive retributivists, in
fact all retributivists, draw from the non-rational but real
feeling that the past counts, separately from future costs and
benefits.
How could Commissioners who do not feel the intuitive urge
to punish appropriately - for whom the past does not count as a
covenant to be kept - who simply reject from the outset
retribution as "a legitimate penological intent" - and give
intuitive emotion no weight - ever feel "compelled" by it?
Thus the Commission majority completely ignored centuries
of traditional retributivism. The Commission ignored the
current resurgence of retributive thought in the academy and
among the people.
Perhaps least defensible of all, the
Commission completely ignored the apparent future dominance
of retributivism in the 21st century.
Explicitly incorporating retribution as punishment's primary
justification, the proposed new Model Penal Code declares:
"Under the new scheme, no utilitarian or restorative purpose of
sentencing may justify a punishment outside the range of
severity proportionate to the gravity of the offense, the harm to

10 7 Attributed to Solon, the ancient Greek law giver. See ROBERT J. BONNER,
LAWYERS AND LmGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS: THE GENESIS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 60 (1927).

JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
81-2 (Macmillan 1883)).
10 8
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the crime victim, and the blameworthiness of the offender." 109
Thus, the new Model Penal Code instructs legislatures to consult
their own moral judgment and apply their own intuitions of
desert to design punishments within the retributive range. 110
Instead of discussing whether retribution, alone, outweighed
the other justifications for the death penalty combined, the
Commission briefly acknowledged themselves "divided about
whether retribution is an appropriate penological intent," worth
counting at all! 111
So by its first finding, this anti-retributivist New Jersey
Death Penalty Commission majority cleverly imposed an
impossibly burdensome standard - "compelling evidence that
death rationally serves a legitimate penological intent" retribution ultimately excluded, emotive retribution completely
ignored. 112

FINDING (2) THE COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY ARE
GREATER THAN THE COSTS OF LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT
PAROLE, BUT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MEASURE THESE COSTS
WITH ANY DEGREE OF PRECISION. 113

Financial costs of the death penalty
"A precise conclusion cannot be reached," the Commission
Report stated up front. Yet the report did specify the death
penalty's enhanced costs from investigation to appeal. The
Public Defender's office estimated that abolishing capital
punishment would save almost $i.5 million per year.114 The
Department of Corrections estimated that eliminating the death
10 9 Model Penal Code § i.02(2)(a)(i) cmt. a at 16 (Discussion Draft April 17,
2006) (emphasis added).

110

Id.

111

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.

112

Id. at 1.

11

3

Id. at 3i.

11

4

Id. at 31.

Fall2007

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 5:1

penalty would save the state approximately $1 million per death
row prisoner over each inmate's lifetime.ns The Administrative
Office of the Courts (AOC) estimated $100,000 extra for each
mandated death penalty proportionality review on appeal. 11 6
The Commission did note in passing that the AOC was unable to
compare death penalty trial costs with non-death penalty
murder trial costs, because "many different variables in murder
trials preclude such a comparison. These variables include the
possibility of plea bargaining (which would negate the need for a
trial altogether)." 11 7
The vast majority of criminal cases result in plea bargains
which not only save time, effort, and costs of trial and appeal,
but also protect against an unpredictable and errant jury
ignoring the evidence and acquitting a sympathetic accused. In
return for pleading guilty, criminals almost always receive lesser
charges or lighter sentences.
Without a death penalty as a threat, what would move an
aggravated murderer to waive trial and appeal, and accept life
without parole?
Perhaps, in a rare case, remorse.
Overwhelmingly, however, first degree murderers plead guilty
and accept life without parole only to avoid the death penalty.
Each such guilty plea saves the people hundreds of thousands of
dollars.
The abolitionist Defense bar could hardly be counted upon to
subtract public money saved by guilty pleas extracted under fear
of death. The Attorney General had noted this huge potential
cost saving from capital punishment, and the Commission did
quote them: "Those defendants who are currently death-eligible
would still face the possibility of life without parole or, at
minimum, a very lengthy sentence, so a protracted trial to
determine guilt would still be necessary." 11s Abolish the death
penalty and predictably there will be more murder trials and
many fewer pleas of guilt with life sentences.
11
s Id. at 32. The Department of Corrections gave a range of $937,430 to
$1,229,240.

116

Id.

11 7

Id.

l18

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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Nobody attached a hard number here like $g3,ooo or $1.2
million. Instead the Commission cleverly further softened these
enormous savings from a death penalty: "The Commission
notes that estimating the cost to the prosecutors is difficult
because the issue involves resource allocation. In other words,
if prosecutors are no longer involved with a lengthy death
penalty case because the death penalty has been eliminated,
they will expend their efforts on other types of prosecutions and
there will not be measurable cost savings." 11 9
But then why is this not also true of the defense? Both
offices, understaffed, would shift personnel. The criminal
justice system, whether prosecution or defense, routinely
generates more work to be done than resources to do it. If
public defenders weren't doing death penalty trials and
investigations, wouldn't they too shift their attention to other
under attended cases, thus eliminating cost savings from
abolition? Why the Commission's asymmetry? After giving
hard numbers to the extra costs of the death penalty, and
softening the extra savings from it, the Commission reiterated
the many immeasurable "cost savings ... from eliminating the
death penalty." 120 But this double counting should not obscure
that extra costs from having a death penalty are the same as cost
savings from eliminating it.
"The Commission notes that ... recent studies in states such
as Tennessee, Kansas, Indiana, Florida and North Carolina have
all concluded that the costs associated with death penalty cases
are significantly higher than those associated with life without
parole cases. These studies can be accessed through the Death
Penalty Information Center."121
Access them. What do we find? While recent studies seem
to show that it does cost more to maintain the death penalty
than life without parole in an individual case, these studies omit
the enormous cost saving for each guilty plea and life sentence
the murderer accepts in order to avoid the death penalty.

11 9

Id. at 33 (emphasis added).

120

Id.

121

Id.
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"That has never been subtracted by any study," this witness
informed the Commission orally and in writing. 122 Only Kansas,
which the Commission mentions without investigation,
specifically acknowledged their own omission, albeit in a
footnote. 123 Once included in the assessment, "it may turn out
that the cost figures come out differently, that it's in fact cheaper
to execute than it is to maintain life without parole," this witness
suggested to the Commission. 124 And "even if it's more
expensive ... justice isn't cheap. And if the death penalty is the
only just alternative then we have to do it even though it may be
expensive. "12s
"The Commission wishes to stress the fact that, although it is
not possible to measure many of the cost savings that would
result from eliminating the death penalty, these savings
nonetheless exist." 12 6 Repeat it enough and it seems to gain
weight.
The Commission, of course, entirely ignored costs of not
doing justice -- a retributive question cloaked as a financial one.
Can we blame Commissioners for ignoring this "cost" when they
do not see the death penalty as the only just result? Should we
criticize the Commission for avoiding the costs of not doing
justice, and all other controversial non-financial, immeasurable
almost metaphorical costs from its calculus? Arguably in its
straightforward second "finding," the Commission should avoid
philosophy and stick to finance: "The costs of the death penalty
are greater than the costs of life in prison without parole, but it
is not possible to measure these costs with any degree of
precision. "127
122
Pub. Hearing, Oct.
Blecker).

11,

2006, supra note 13, at 41 (testimony of Robert

Legislative Division of Post Audit, State of Kansas, Costs Incurred for
Death Penalty Cases: A K-GOAL Audit of the Department of Corrections 19
(2003).
12 3

12
4 Pub. Hearing, Oct.
Blecker).

125

12

2006, supra note 13, at 41 (testimony of Robert

Id.

6 COMM'N

12 7

11,

Id. at i.

REPORT, supra note 1, at 33.
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Fair enough. Avoid emotional costs entirely. Except behold!
- as the Commission's "cost" analysis continued.

Emotional and psychological costs of the death
penalty
"The Commission heard from a number of family members
of murder victims about the devastating emotional costs of the
death penalty. Survivors testified to the pain of being forced to
relive the trauma of their loved ones' murders during prolonged
appeals." 12 s Victims' families talked of the frustration of
wanting and waiting for their loved ones' killers to die. Much of
the victims' family bitterness and frustration came from the
false promise of justice. The system would never deliver on its
promise - endless stays and reversals from a state supreme
court that would not allow an execution.
"A psychologist . . . testified about the adverse effects of
executions on . . . judges, jurors . . . correctional staff,
journalists, clergy and spiritual advisors, as well as the families
of the . . . condemned . . . . The Commission finds that these
intangible emotional and psychological costs must also be
taken into consideration in weighing the costs of the death
penalty." 12 9
So, non-quantifiable emotional costs do count. Then how
about the cost of not doing justice? In some cases, abolishing
the death penalty -- retributively, the only proportional
punishment - abolishes justice. Yet even the minority of
Commissioners such as Kathleen Garcia, while bitterly
denouncing life-without-parole as inadequate for vicious killers
who deserve to die, refused to see justice not done as an added
cost, since no murderer in New Jersey was being executed
anyway. Steeped in the reality of victims' families suffering from
false promise, she voted to eliminate any hope of doing justice,
because of the current abolitionist mood on the state high
court. 13°

12s

Id. at 33.

12

Id. at 34 (emphasis added).

1

9

3°

Id. at 93-96.
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How about the cost to parents who realize their child's rapist
murderer now lives in prison playing basketball or watching the
New Jersey Nets play on a color TV? What does it cost to
contemplate the person who tortured your child to death now
lying on a prison bed, lost in a first run movie or good book?
Avoiding emotive retributivism, the Commission report
completely ignores all emotional costs of not doing justice.

FINDING (3):

THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT THE
DEATH PENALTY IS INCONSISTENT WITH EVOLVING
STANDARDS OF DECENCY. 13 1

That mantra of the modern era: "Evolving standards of
decency of a maturing society." Suppose we all subscribe to the
U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement: The meaning of the 8th
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment is informed
by "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society."132
Does it offend our maturing sense of dignity and decency to
put to death the worst of our murderers? Does this boil down to
a public opinion poll, rightly conducted? Can the public's sense
of decency sometimes regress, or recede rather than mature?
Two very different viewpoints frame this great debate: All
absolutists - whether they are retributivists unalterably
committed to punishing with death all (but only) those who
deserve it, or abolitionists unalterably committed to eradicating
the death penalty - know intuitively and feel certain there is one
right, "mature" answer to this great question - "is death ever
justified punishment?"
Relativists or Utilitarians, on the other hand, would settle the
question of capital punishment by comparing its costs and
benefits, assessing its effectiveness as a crime control measure,
while always taking into account public opinion and particular
social context: Does death incapacitate the condemned and
deter other would-be killers more cheaply and efficiently than
life imprisonment without parole? If so, let's have it; if not, let's
not.
1 1

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.

1 2

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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Since Plato battled the sophists in the 5th century B.C.,
Western Culture's ancient traditions include the controversy
over truth. The sophists denied objective truth; everything was
opinion and appearance. Truth, justice, was whatever a person
or society could be persuaded to act upon. Using the wisdom of
Heraclitus that "you could not step in the same river twice,"
today's sophist-abolitionists look upon "evolving standards" as
strictly a matter of public perception or opinion. There would be
no moral fact of the matter. Evolving standards of a maturing
society would amount to little more than potentially fluctuating
public opinion. The prevailing tastes of today - the present govern.
Moral facts, however, move us absolutists.
Whether strongly supporting or opposing the death penalty,
in common absolutists reject today's public opinion as the
arbiter of death's decency or indecency. Absolutist abolitionists
feel certain that society violates human dignity when under
cover of law we methodically kill fellow human beings who pose
no imminent threat to us. Absolutist proponents, on the other
hand, also feel certain - unfortunately and undeniably - that
this very nasty world contains predatory, vicious people who
engage in behavior so despicable and destructive, with an
attitude so cruel or callous, that they deserve to die. Obliged to
do justice, Society must execute them. By killing these vicious
killers for their cruelty, we acknowledge their responsibility and thereby whatever little humanity remains.
So, we absolutists - abolitionists and retributivists alike embrace human dignity as our ultimate issue. We reject any
suggestion that the death penalty's decency or indecency
ultimately rests on shifting public opinion.
Absolutist opponents of capital punishment, however,
happily make sophistic common cause with their utilitarian
brethren: Public rejection alone, however temporary, should
permanently Constitutionally damn the death penalty, they
insist, while public support alone, however robust, can never
make it Constitutional, even for a moment.
Let's follow the Commission, into a relativist, subjective
world of "evolving standards" and public opinion. During the
hearings witnesses insisted on the "growing national consensus
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for abolition of the death penalty." 133 A professional pollster,
Patrick Murray, testified that although a clear majority of those
polled maintains an abstract preference for the death penalty,
when given the alternative punishment of life without parole as
an option, at least in New Jersey, more people prefer it to
death. 134
But carefully consider a standard poll question: "Which
punishment do you prefer for people convicted of murder: the
death penalty or life in prison with no chance of parole." Note
the fallacy of that standard question? How it doubly distorts.
First, 'for people convicted of murder' or Gallup's "which is the
better penalty for murder?" 13s
Discriminating, informed,
retributivist advocates would reserve the death penalty only for
aggravated murder - the "worst of the worst." Suppose we
recognize, along with the U.S. Supreme Court and every death
penalty jurisdiction in the U.S. that the vast majority of
murderers do not deserve to die? 136 How should we answer this
question? Do we "prefer" death or life without parole ''for cases
of murder"?
Real retributivists oppose the death penalty for most "cases
of murder." Only for the most despicable murderers do we favor
it. Should we answer "life" and allow their poll to count us as
abolitionists?

1

33

Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 49 (testimony of Edith

Frank).
134 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 68 (testimony of Patrick
Murray).
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SELL THE TuRNPIKE, VOTERS SAY, Jan. 24, 2007 at #34, available at
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaselD=1006 Oast visited Nov. 8,
2007) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Carroll, Joseph, Americans and the Death
GALLUP,
Dec.
15,
2004,
available
at
Penalty,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14371/Americans-Death-Penalty.aspx Oast visited
Nov. 7, 2007).
1 35

See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 125.27 (McKinney 2003).
1

36
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Secondly, consider the last part of the question: "with no
chance of parole" 137 or Gallup's "with absolutely no possibility
of parole." 138 Abolitionists delight in emphasizing that we who
sometimes favor death cannot be "absolutely certain" an
innocent person will never be executed - and thus we should
abolish the penalty rather than take infinitesimal if inescapable
risks. Yet the very same opponents who would disable us from
acting on near-certainty, blithely assure their fellow citizens that
life without parole carries "no chance" of parole.
Most citizens will equate "absolutely no possibility of parole"
with "no possibility of release." Few people would factor in
executive clemency. And, while a parole board may almost
never release a convicted mass murderer, even after he has aged
and now seems gentle and no longer any threat to anyone, a
future legislature may simply abolish life without parole
altogether and apply it retroactively. Europe does not have life
without parole, although you'd be hard pressed to know this
from leading media news outlets whose editorials otherwise
urge us to follow Europe's lead. 1 39
Although by written statement and live testimony, this
witness warned the Commission of these distortions, the
Commission report simply ignored these warnings. 14°
The standard poll question further distorts and artificially
diminishes support for the death penalty by making the
aggravated murder itself little more than an abstract event.
Polls discourage respondents from matching a concrete
punishment to a specific crime. Of course abolitionist pollsters
shy away from asking even the abstract question directly: 'Do
you favor the death penalty for the worst murderers - for
example a serial killer who rapes and tortures children?' Once
made aware of the victim's suffering and the killer's viciousness,
what punishment will the overwhelming majority match to
QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLLING INSTITUTE, supra note 135 (emphasis

l37

added).
13 8

Americans and the Death Penalty, supra note 135 (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Pub. Hearing, Oct.
Robert Blecker).
139

1 4°

11,

2006, supra note 13, at 48 (testimony of

See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1.
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torturing and killing children? That question - do you favor the
death penalty for the worst murderers? - the real question abolitionist pollsters and the Commission must avoid.
During the hearings, two commissioners picked up on
distorted polling and pressed Patrick Murray, the pollster.
Commissioner DeFazio asked: "Do you realize that when the
more specific questions are asked, and when I say 'more
specific,' I mean fact sensitive questions are asked .... you would
agree with me if the question was asked, 'Would you support the
death penalty for Timothy McVeigh?' the percentage would rise
astronomically?"141
"Yes,''142 Murray replied. Commissioner DeFazio followed
up: "underlying all of this is the theory that the punishment
should fit the specific crime."143
Commissioner Moczula also inquired about the polling
process, asking: "You did not ask in these polls, 'Do you favor
the death penalty were it limited to particularly heinous or
extraordinary murders?'; it was a general question on favoring
the death penalty."144 The pollster conceded. "That's correct.
None of the polls ... in New Jersey had asked that question." 14s
And the Commissioner pressed again: "Did you ask the
question, 'Do you favor the death penalty versus life without
parole, but with the possibility of executive clemency?"'146
"No, we did not ask that question,'' Murray admitted. 147
Ironic, then, how the same pollsters who claimed that
theoretical or abstract support for the death penalty
substantially diminishes when concrete alternatives of life
141 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 77 (testimony of Edward
J. DeFazio, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n).
14 2

Id. (testimony of Patrick Murray).

1 43 Id. at 79 (testimony of Edward J. DeFazio, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty
Study Comm'n).

1 44

Id. at 85 (testimony of Boris Moczula).

1 45

Id. at 85 (testimony of Patrick Murray).

1 46

Id. at 85 (testimony of Boris Moczula).

1 47

Id. at 85-86 (testimony Patrick Murray).
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without parole are presented - make certain to keep the crime
itself abstract, and also imply falsely in their question that the
alternative of life without parole is certain and most severe. As
we'll see, the Commission did orchestrate witnesses to rebut any
suggestion that considering the crime and its punishment
concretely, an "informed citizenry" would overwhelmingly reject
life without parole in favor of death.
But in its third finding, the Commission majority avoided
deep questions of whether public opinion necessarily matures.
It ignored serious flaws in polling regimes. And it obscured
concrete details of both crime and punishment, determined to
find death indecent but unwilling to express its abolitionist
absolutism lest it lose the votes of death penalty advocates on
the Commission, thoroughly disgusted and worn out by long
delays.
So, instead, the Commission majority artfully managed its
conclusion, finding "increasing evidence that the death penalty
is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency." 14s
"Increasing evidence." What a burden of persuasion they
would place upon themselves!
The death penalty was used less these days, the Commission
noted, which of course could mean that prosecutors and juries
were getting more discriminating in seeking death and imposing
it, decently reserving the ultimate sanction for the ultimate
crime. The Commission pointed, among other things, to a 2000
Quinnipiac poll which "found that only 40% of State residents
believed that the death penalty deters other potential
murderers.'' 149 This statement is either completely irrelevant to
the question of decency, or if it is relevant cuts just the wrong
way. The polls consistently indicate an overwhelming public
support for the death penalty based upon just deserts, and in
spite of a (mis)perceived failure to deter.
Persistent retributive support for the penalty shows that
supporters feel certain that sometimes death provides the only
decent response.
The Commission report noted the "number of witnesses from
the religious community" who "uniformly urged abolishing the
l48

COMM'N REPORT,

1 49

Id. at 36.

supra note 1, at 35.
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death penalty." 15° Apparently specially counting beliefs of
religious leaders in a secular society did not bother the
Commission. Nor did the Commission refer to the embarrassing
fact that while ordinary Americans generally affiliate religiously,
they often split with the religious elites over this issue.
Noting "an emerging national consensus against executing
certain defendants convicted of murder,'' the Commission
somehow found support in United States Supreme Court
opinions for increasing evidence of indecency. 15 1 They pointed
to high Court decisions striking down the death penalty for a
robbery getaway driver who did not kill or intend anyone be
killed, 15 2 a rapist of an adult woman who did not otherwise
injure his victim, 153 juveniles who killed, 154 and mentally
retarded murderers. 155
This witness had cited those very same Court opinions to the
Commission, as evidence that the Supreme Court employed
retributive thinking to limit punishment it found objectively
disproportionately severe. 156
Citing recent legislation
nationwide, the Supreme Court Justices had buttressed their
own moral judgments of disproportionality by pointing to an
emerging consensus against executing these relatively
sympathetic defendants.
These Court decisions, and the
supposed emerging consensus which buttressed them, however,
had nothing to do with the public attitude or moral fact of
proportionality of death for the worst of the worst.
Even the Commission had to acknowledge this: "Although
the Commission recognizes that similarly strong evidence of a

150

Id.

1 1

Id. at 37.

5

1 2

5

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).

1

53

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

1

54

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

155

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

56

Pub. Hearing, Oct.
Blecker).
1
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2006, supra note 13, at 34-35 (testimony of Robert
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consensus against the death penalty in general has not yet
emerged, there are suggestions of such a trend." 157
"Suggestions of a trend" - another lightweight burden these
upon
themselves.
abolitionist
Commissioners
placed
Determined to find "increasing evidence" of "inconsistency" and
"suggestions of a trend," the Commission relied on isolated
instances of opposition, starting with the infamous Governor
George Ryan, convicted felon, emptying Illinois' death row. 158
Their "evidence" of a trend continued: "New York's death
penalty statute (enacted in 1995) was struck down by that state's
Court of Appeals in 2004 and the New York legislature has thus
far failed to act to reinstate it." 159 Of course the Commission
conveniently failed to mention that the Court struck down the
statute by a single vote, 4-3, basing its decision not at all upon
"evolving standards of decency" but solely on the unique and
uncommonly stupid unrelated "jury deadlock" provision. 16°
Their evidence continued: "In the past two years legislation
to abolish the death penalty has been introduced in the
legislatures of 10 states: Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee and
Washington." 16 1
So, they would locate support for finding the death penalty
constitutionally indecent in the failure of one state to reinstate a
death penalty judicially struck down by a bitterly divided court
on other grounds, and in legislation introduced (sometimes by a
single legislator). The Commission saw a national decline in
death penalties meted out as further evidence of rejection,
rather than prosecutors' and juries' greater care and moral
discrimination. And bootstrapping, they Commission also
mentioned moratoria such as New Jersey's own, as evidence of
rejection rather than a pause to study the issue.

supra note 1, at 39.

1 57

COMM'N REPORT,

15s

Id.

159

Id. (referencing People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (N.Y. 2004)).

1

People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (N.Y. 2004).

6°

161

COMM'N REPORT,

supra note 1, at 40 (emphasis added).
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Of course the Commission once again conveniently omitted
all counter-evidence.
In Massachusetts, a long-standing abolitionist state, a
unanimous jury of 12 had recently decided death in a federal
prosecution. 16 2 Nor did they mention the recent referendum in
Wisconsin, another state without the penalty for more than a
century, where 56% of the people voted to reinstate it. 163 This
official state referendum - this great poll - undermined the
Commission's conclusion, so the Commission ignored it.
As it turned out, had the Commission's report come out later,
it could have pointed to serious efforts to repeal the death
penalty in several legislatures which passed at least one house,
or made it out of committee but were thereafter defeated. On
the other hand a unanimous federal jury gave the death penalty
to a cop killer in New York; 1 64 South Dakota executed its first
condemned in 60 years; 1 6s and several state legislatures
expanded death eligibles to include rapists of children who did
not kill their young victims. 1 66
A Wisconsin legislator
introduced legislation to restore capital punishment, 167 New

1 2

6

United States v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).

See Capital Punishment: On Pain of Death, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
SENTINEL, Nov. 10, 2006, at 18, available at 2006 WLNR 23486756. See also
Vikas Bajaj et al., THE 2006 ELECTIONS: STATE BY STATE; Midwest, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html
?res=9Do3E1D61E3FF93AA;35752C1A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted
=all.
1 63

164 Michael Brick, Jury Agrees on Death Sentence for the Killer of Two
Detectives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com

/ 2007/ 01/ 31/nyregion/ 31death.html?n= Top /Reference/Times%20Topics/Peo
ple/B /Brick, %20Michael.
165 Monica Davey, Execution in South Dakota, Delayed a Year by Debate
on Method, Is First in 6 Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, available at

http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 2007/07/13/us/ 13execute.html?n =Top /Reference/T
imes%20Topics/People/D/Davey, %2oMonica.
1 66

See State v. Kennedy, 957 so.2d

1 67

WISCONSIN: Sen. Lasee Introduces Bill Regarding Death Penalty, U.S.
10, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 6803854.

FEDERAL NEWS, Apr.

757, 780 (La. 2007).
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York's senate re-enacted a capital statute. 1 68 And perhaps most
significantly, in New Jersey itself, the Quinnipiac poll showed a
substantial majority of citizens opposed the Commission's own
recommendation to abolish the death penalty! 1 69
But without such evidence and ignoring what bad news it
had, the Commission simply imposed a featherweight burden on
itself and blithely announced its finding.
FINDING (4) THE AVAILABLE DATA DO NOT SUPPORT A
FINDING OF INVIDIOUS RACIAL BIAS IN THE APPLICATION OF
THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW JERSEY.

Judge Baime's annual studies showing no racial bias in the
administration of the death penalty in New Jersey effectively
took race out of the Commission's arsenal, and thus largely
eliminated the issue from this discussion. 1 7°
To avoid moral disproportionality, based on class and
correlated with race, this witness urged the Commission to
modify the state statute, rejecting a drug-dealing aggravator,
and abolish capital robbery felony murder.171 Keeping these
morally irrelevant aggravators in a world where underprivileged
inner city youths regularly commit economically motivated
crimes guarantees that blacks and other minorities will be
disproportionately death eligible. A deadly ethos governs the
drug trade, directed within at thieves, robbers and business
rivals. The robbery-murder and drug aggravator virtually
guarantee that the inner city poor will disproportionately show
up among the condemned.
1 68

State's

Al Baker, Republicans Seek a Bipartisan Vote on a Bill to Reinstate the
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, available at

http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 2005/ 03/ 02/nyregion/ 02death.html.
QUINNIPIAC UNNERSITY POLLING INSTITUTE, NEW JERSEY VOTERS AREN'T
BANKING ON PROPERTY TAX CUTS, QUINNIPIAC UNNERSITY POLL FINDS; DON'T
SELL THE TuRNPIKE, VOTERS SAY, Jan. 24, 2007 at #34, available at
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaselD=1006 Oast visited Nov. 8,
2007).
1 69

17°

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 41 (2007).

7 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 57-58 (statement of Robert
Blecker).
1 1
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Bent on simply abolishing death as punishment, the
Commission was in no mood to consider how to redefine capital
crimes so as to radically reduce whatever race effect remained.
Instead, the Commission ignored this race effect in defining
capital crimes, and moved past the issue quickly.17 2

THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS 5-7
From different angles, although rarely explicitly, the
Commission's findings Five, Six, and Seven return us to the
original question - not public perception, not costs and benefits
- but justice, really the primary penological justification for any
punishment.
The Commission almost never used the word "justice" in its
report.
Explicitly considering the justice of retaining or
abolishing capital punishment would have forced it to address
whether some murderers deserve to die. This would have split
Commissioners, dividing those who desperately desired that
vicious killers die, if only the courts would allow us to kill them,
from the majority of Commissioners who, not feeling retributive
anger, either rejected retribution entirely, or thought retribution
could be satisfied without death.
But the Commission's three findings from overlapping
perspectives did really focus in upon justice:

(5) Abolition of the death penalty will eliminate the
risk of disproportionality in capital sentencing.
( 6) The penological interest in executing a small
number of persons guilty of murder is not sufficiently
compelling to justify the risk of making an irreversible
mistake.
(7) The alternative of life imprisonment in a
maximum security institution without the possibility of
parole would sufficiently ensure public safety and
address other legitimate social and penological
interests, including the interests of the families of
murder victims.
172

COMM'N REPORT,

supra note 1, at 44.
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FINDING (5) ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY WILL
ELIMINATE THE RISK OF DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING. 173

Proportionality

Western culture at its core embraces proportionality. This
most deeply held common value - that punishment must fit the
crime - continues to dominate contemporary U.S. Supreme
Court death penalty jurisprudence. 1 74
For twenty-five hundred years, proportionality has acted as a
deep constraint and sacred duty in meting out punishment.
Originally, like-for-like, "an eye for an eye," exact 1:1 reciprocity
supplied the simplest and most obvious measure of
proportionality. But justice required less symmetric measures
for some crimes, and some criminals: "If the guilty man
deserves to be beaten," Deuteronomy declares, "the judge shall
cause him to lie down and be beaten with a number of stripes in
proportion to his offense," 17s or in another translation,
"according to the measure of his wickedness". 1 76 The Magna
Carta (1215) continued our commitment to proportional
punishment: "A free man shall be amerced for a small fault only
according to the measure thereof, and for a great crime
according to its magnitude."177
The European Enlightenment embraced liberty and
rationality. Instead of beating a person in proportion to the
offense, the new punitive proportionality consisted in depriving
the criminal of units of freedom. Thus, as Foucault described it,
"the pain of the body itself is no longer the constituent element
173

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.

74 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957 (1991); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
1

175

Deuteronomy 25:2 (English Standard) (emphasis added).

176

Deuteronomy 25:2 (Darby).

m MAGNA CARTA §20 (1215) (England) reprinted in A.E. Dick Howard,
Magna Carta Text and Commentary 40 (1978).
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of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensations
punishment has become an economy of suspended rights." 1 78
The infant American Republic embraced this rational
proportionality by building penitentiaries and substituting
prison time for bodily punishment.
Although several early state constitutions specifically
included proportionality principles - "All penalties ought to be
proportioned to the nature of the offence," declared New
Hampshire's in 17841 79 - the U.S. Constitution nowhere
explicitly commands proportional punishment.
The 8th
Amendment, however, seems to imply it, by prohibiting
"excessive bail", "excessive fines", and "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment."
In 1892, declaring the 8th Amendment was "directed ...
against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged",
Justice Field, dissenting, would have prohibited Vermont from
sentencing a seller of unlicensed liquor to 54 years at hard
labor. 18° Such a harsh punishment, "six times as great as any
court in Vermont could have imposed for manslaughter" and
"appropriate only for felonies of an atrocious nature", was
"greatly disproportioned to the offense," and therefore "unusual
and cruel." 181
A hundred years later, in a leading case, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed Michigan's right to mandate life without parole
for simple possession of a little more than a pound of cocaine.
"The Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
guarantee," insisted Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. 18 2 Justice Scalia later noted that "there is no
objective standard of gravity." 183 These two Justices saw
l78

MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 11 (Alan Sheridan trans.,

Vintage Books 1979) (1977).
179

N.H. CONST. art. 18 (1784).

180

O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (emphasis added).

181

Id. at 339, 364.

1 2

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965.

183

Id. at 988.
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'proportionality' as a pretext for their colleagues to impose their
own "subjective values".
But the other Justices disagreed. "[C]ourts have not baldly
substituted their own subjective moral values for those of the
legislature," countered Justice White, joined by Blackmun and
Stevens, dissenting in Harmelin. 184 Michigan, with no death
penalty, could not constitutionally reserve the same punishment
for drug possession as it had for first degree murder.
Justice Kennedy, joined by O'Connor and Souter, upheld
Harmelin's life sentence but occupied the current Constitutional
middle ground: "The Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids
only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to
the crime." 18s A judge should only perform "intrajurisdictional
and interjurisdictional analyses" in the "rare case" where "a
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality." 186
More recently in Ewing, the court again split into three factions,
a majority (5-4) affirming California's right to its popular "three
strikes and you're out" life sentence for a career criminal whose
latest crime was shoplifting three golf clubs. 1 87
How can state legislatures impose the same punishment for
petit theft or drug possession as for aggravated murder without
violating basic standards of disproportionality? How can a
Supreme Court tolerate this, and hold it constitutionally
permissible? Only by ignoring retribution as a limit on
punishment,
and
tolerating
all
but
the
grossest
disproportionality.
The new Model Penal Code's official commentary attacks this
standard of gross disproportionality that has taken root in
federal constitutional law by reaffirming the essential
connection between proportionality and retribution which
should provide the floor and ceiling to a range of permissible
1 84

Id. at 1016 (White, J., dissenting).

185

Id. at 1001 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 288, 303 (1983)).

1 86

Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

187

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
U.S. 63 (2003).

11

(2003). See also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
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punishments. Essentially unrevised for four decades, the Model
Penal Code's "new approach" now calls for punishment "within
a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the
harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of
offenders. "188
Proportionality plays a special role in death penalty
jurisprudence. Here, the Supreme Court more readily limits
state legislatures by invoking proportionality requirements
implicit in the 8th Amendment.
When a bare majority of the Court struck down capital
punishment in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia, 18 9 inaugurating the
modern era of death penalty jurisprudence, Justices Brennan
and Marshall would have held death as punishment per se cruel
and unconstitutional. For these and like-minded absolutist
opponents, the death penalty is an inhumane, morally
disproportionate response to any crime, no matter how heinous.
Three other Justices in Furman found the death penalty
unconstitutional because it was "freakishly imposed," "cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
and unusual," and applied chaotically to a "capriciously selected,
random handful" - in no proportion and thus cruel and unusual
punishment. 19° Justice Douglas separately condemned the
death penalty as "disproportionately imposed and carried out
on the poor, the Negro, and members of unpopular groups." 1 9 1
After thirty-five states responded to Furman by re-enacting
new death penalty statutes, 1 9 2 the United States Supreme Court
warned them again: "the punishment must not be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime."1 93 However, "we cannot
say the punishment [of death] is invariably disproportionate to
the crime," the Court concluded, restoring the death penalty to
188

Model Penal Code§ i.02(2)(a)(i) (Discussion Draft April 17, 2006).

1

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

89

19°

Id. at 309-310 (Stewart, J., concurring).

191

Id. at 249-250 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

1 2

9

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 155 (1976).

1

93

Id. at 173.

Fall2007

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 5:1

the United States. 1 94 "[This] is an extreme sanction, suitable to
the most extreme of crimes." 195
Death was "indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime
of raping an adult woman," Justice White declared for a
plurality in Coker. 196 Dissenting Justices in Coker, who would
have permitted Georgia to execute rapists, agreed with the
majority in principle: "I accept that the Eighth Amendment's
concept of disproportionality bars the death penalty for minor
crimes," Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
conceded. 1 97 Whether death is a proportionate response for
serial child-rapists remains an open question, soon to be tested.
Five years after Coker, the Supreme Court in Enmund, held
five to four that death was a disproportionate penalty for a
getaway car driver who neither intended nor expected his cofelon to shoot and kill their robbery victim. 1 9s Dissenting,
Justice O'Connor stated common ground for the Court: "[T]he
penalty imposed in a capital case [must] be proportional to the
harm caused and the defendant's blameworthiness.'' 1 99 A few
years later, Justice O'Connor found herself in the majority in
Tison, holding that a reckless and depraved indifference to
human life without an intent to kill, could make death a
proportional penalty for a felony-murder accomplice. 200
Harm and blameworthiness - essential components of
proportionality - require a particularized consideration of each
crime and each criminal. Thus, as a constitutional punishment,
death must not be grossly disproportionate to the crime, and it
must not be disproportionate to the criminal's particular
culpability, however measured.

1 94

Id. at 187.

l95Id.
1

96

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).

197

Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

19s

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).

1 99

Id. at 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

200

Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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If New Jersey abolished the death penalty and substituted
life without parole as the Commission recommends, 201 the
problem of proportionality would hardly disappear. Would
multiple killers who rape and torture children receive
proportional punishment by spending the rest of their lives in
prison, no longer under a sentence of death? Would they get
what they deserve? Any legislature considering abolishing or
restoring the death penalty must face this.
So let's return to the Commission's finding itself: Of course
abolishing the death penalty "eliminate[s] the risk of
disproportionality in capital sentencing." 202 It eliminates capital
sentencing entirely, so it eliminates disproportionality as well as
everything else about the death penalty.
Surely the Commission would not trivialize the great
challenge with such literalist cheap tricks.
Assume the
Commission did intend to focus on the real problem of
disproportionality in punishment. How, then, can it fail even to
consider whether eliminating the death penalty and substituting
life without parole for aggravated murder thereby radically
elevates the risk of disproportionality in the new non-capital
sentencing regime?
Supporting its call for abolition under cover of a "risk of
disproportionality," the Commission pointed out that many
other aggravated murderers had not been sentenced to death. 20 3
Under any likely death penalty regime, some will live who
deserve to die, and some will die who deserve to linger in prison.
This disproportionality does trouble us retributivist advocates.
The current statute 204 does fail to capture some of the worst of
the worst. Thus, this witness testified at length and in writing,
urging a set of statutory reforms to effectuate a more morally
proportioned death penalty, further reducing the risk of
executing those murderers who did not deserve to die. 20 s Bent

201

COMM'N REPORT,

202

Id. at 1.

20

Id. at 46.

3

20 4

1,

N.J. STAT. ANN.§

at 6-10.

supra note 1, at 2.

2C:11-3

(West 2007). See

COMM'N REPORT,

supra note
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on eliminating the death penalty entirely, however, the
Commission ignored any possible revision.
Refined definitions have their limit. Juries will spare
convicted killers whose murders otherwise qualify for death
because the murderer's own tragic past cries out for mercy.
Abused as children, deformed by a cruel environment, some
killers' compelling personal circumstances rightly move a jury to
spare them.
Real proportionality demands individualized
justice - somewhat erratic, unpredictable, not fully accountable
by the crime's definition or description. Plato and Aristotle
called this irregular, individuated justice "equity." 20 6
Today's penalty phase seeks an equitable, proportional
justice, case by case, person by person.
A bit cheeky, then, of Commissioners who cannot imagine
anyone deserving to die, to use the fact that we allow some
terrible murderers to live as grounds to spare even those whom
a jury, considering all personal circumstances, would still
condemn.
Does it make sense to abandon completely any attempt at
proportional, individual justice because we cannot always
produce it?
Confronted with the most egregious killings
committed from the most despicable motives, should we not do
what we can, although at other times in other cases, we failed to
do what we should?
But give the Commission its due. Luck, rather than desert
sometimes determines the outcome. At some level, this is true
throughout life. Innocent victims of violent crime, innocent
passengers or pedestrians live or die daily based upon
happenstance. Wrong place, wrong time, wrong prosecutor,
wrong jury - to some degree luck remains inescapably part of
life, and death.

Moral Luck
That deep phenomenon - "moral luck." Should New Jersey
confine the death penalty to murder? Many years ago, a killer
20 5 Pub. Hearing, Oct.
Robert Blecker).

20 6

11,

2006, supra note 13, at 67-69 (testimony of

ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

Welldon, trans., London, Macmillan 1897).
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told me the story of an "acquaintance" who raped a woman,
chopped off her arms and legs, and threw her in the woods,
bleeding to death.
Most everyone would agree that whatever a society's ultimate
punishment, this vicious criminal deserved it. As luck would
have it, a hunter came upon the victim, who was miraculously
saved. Should this happenstance - that the victim lived having nothing to do with the intention or behavior of the
criminal dictate a lesser punishment? Should attempted mass
murderers such as Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, who come
perilously close to blowing up a plane in flight, 20 7 be treated any
more leniently than those who do succeed in killing their
victims?
The ancient Greeks and the ancient Hebrews - twin sources
of Western culture -- were torn by the problem, psychologically
and jurisprudentially. 20 8 No one has ever come up with a
completely satisfactory solution. It is impossible to pay full
attention to the criminal's act and attitude without also paying
attention to the harm, even though a lesser harm may be
morally divorced from the actor's intention. It is impossible to
demand full consistency - treating like cases alike - and at the
same time respect the individuality of each unique human being.
The luck of location - county variability, with which the
Commission briefly wrestled - raises the same issue, but to a
different level. 20 9 It may be impossible to demand state-wide
consistency while respecting local autonomy. At best, we
acknowledge the problem of moral luck, conduct proportionality
reviews, and ask of each death sentence in isolation: was it
deserved? If so, then although others too, in different places at
different times, warranted but escaped society's ultimate
sanction, we do what we ought, when we can.

7 Cathy B. Thomas, Courage in the Air, TIME, Sept. 9, 2002, at 108,
available at http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020909/aattendants.html.
20

20 s See Robert Blecker, Roots Resolving the Death Penalty: Wisdom from
the Ancients, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:

REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL
SANCTION 169 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2003).
20 9

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
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Demanding regularity under the guise of rejecting
arbitrariness - luck - ultimately undermines our ability to give
play to non-rational, but real, incomparables that make up
equity, real justice. Each case is different and a commitment to
individual justice must respect that real differences are not
always rational or discernable in advance.
The Commission almost never explicitly addressed "justice."
It never directly faced the central question of proportionality:
whether a most vicious killer can ever "deserve to die" or does
s/he always "deserve to live," albeit in prison? These terms of
great emotional significance would have split Commissioners.
Considering "justice," "desert" and real "proportionality" would
have forced those Commissioners to dissent who did feel certain
the worst of the worst do deserve to die, but reluctantly yielded
to their feeling of helplessness in ever bringing about the justice
of death.
Absolutist opponents would have been forced to reveal
themselves for who they were, and acknowledge the truth: For
them it was never an open question.
Instead, these
Commissioners were allowed to go through the motions of
hearings, apparently making a record, while all the time
committed to abolition.
Ultimately, however, they cannot responsibly avoid it;
proportionality will justify, limit, or condemn capital
punishment itself. But proportionality, too, will justify or
condemn substituting life without parole as punishment for
aggravated murder, a question the Commission seemed
compelled to face in its seventh finding. 210 Subjecting drug
dealers or career thieves to life in prison inflicts obscenely harsh
and thus disproportional punishment. Sentencing child-killing
rapists to that very same life, without chance of parole, inflicts
obscenely lenient and thus disproportional punishment.

210

Id. at 56.
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FINDING (6) THE PENOLOGICAL INTEREST IN EXECUTING A
SMALL NUMBER OF PERSONS GUILTY OF MURDER IS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING TO JUSTIFY THE RISK OF MAKING
AN IRREVERSIBLE MISTAKE. 211

Of all disproportionality, the worst imaginable is that the
state might make a mistake and execute an innocent person.
This nightmare, however improbable, haunts retributivist
advocates no less than abolitionists. Whereas utilitarians whether favoring or opposing capital punishment - can
theoretically support executing the innocent for other public
benefits such as deterrence, retributivists cannot abide it.
Commissioner Segars put the question strongly: "Isn't the
fact that you could possibly execute even one innocent person
worth the cost of deciding upon life without the possibility of
parole to avoid that ... possible human error?" 212
She also drew attention to Sunstein and Vermeule's recent
essay, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?, where the
authors link deterrence to the moral question of executing the
innocent. 213 Given that most recent studies show the death
penalty, on balance, probably deters more effectively than life
without parole, doesn't the government by not executing the
guilty bear responsibility, they ask, for the other innocent
murder victims whose lives would have been saved by the
greater deterrent power of death? 214 "[C]apital punishment
requires a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the
sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that
form of punishment," they concluded. 21s
Thus even if a few innocents were executed, "on certain
empirical assumptions, capital punishment may be morally
211

Id. at 51.

212
Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 147 (Sept. 13, 2006)
(statement ofYvonne S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n).

21 3 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally
Required? The Relevance ofLife-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2006).

214

Id.

21

Id. at 703 (abstract).
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required, not for retributive reasons, but rather to prevent the
taking of innocent lives." 216 Considering the literature and logic
of deterrence, these authors concluded that "[a]t the very least,
those who object to capital punishment, and who do so in the
name of protecting life, must come to terms with the possibility
that the failure to inflict capital punishment will fail to protect
life." 217 In short, their "central concern is that foregoing any
given execution may be equivalent to condemning some
unidentified people to a premature and violent death." 21s
A strictly non-retributive utilitarian whose overarching goal
was to minimize the deaths of innocents might well uphold the
death penalty as the only way to go.
People make mistakes that change the course of human
events. Few mistakes can be fully reversed. Life itself and the
process of growing old:
not reversible.
Life in prison:
terminable, but not reversible.
Yet death is different,
irreversibly different. Although DNA testing may help insure
that only the guilty are condemned, it is "not a panacea," 21 9 and,
"inevitably, we make mistakes." 22 0
Still we cannot yet identify and demonstrate among the
thousand or so, executed during the modern era (1977-2007),
any factually innocent person. 221 Yet, most tragically, we
probably have killed at least one and perhaps a few who did not
commit the murder for which they were condemned. This
horrible fact hardly substantiates the hyperbole concerning
innocence permeating abolitionist circles, and occasionally

216

Id.

at

705.

21

7

Id.

at

708.

21s

Id.

21
9 Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 19 (testimony of Barry C.
Scheck).

22

° COMM'N MEETINGS, supra note 22, at 40 (statement of R. Erik Lillquist).

See Kansas
concurring).
221

v.

Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2533 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
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repeated in the hearings: "innocent people [are] being executed .
. . throughout this country." 22 2
Abolitionists on the Commission produced witnesses from
other states with moving accounts of how they were
"exonerated" while imprisoned, sometimes having been
condemned to die. 22 3 Some of these witnesses probably were
factually innocent; perhaps all were. We don't know. We do
know that these exonerees blithely listed other "innocents"
along with themselves. 224
Witness Roberto Melendez Colon, whose testimony
Commissioner Segars found "compelling," 22s listed Benny
Demps as one of "four right from the top" on Florida's death row
who, like him, were "innocent" yet condemned. 22 6
I happened to witness the people of Florida put Benny
Demps to death.
His victims, the Puhlicks, were good,
upstanding folk. 22 7
Dubbed "the flower lady" in the
neighborhood, she dreamed of retiring to Florida with her
contractor husband. They worked hard - he, as a carpenter and
she, sometimes cleaning houses - to put the kids through
college.
Mrs. Puhlick's cousin, a real estate agent, called them about a
"handyman's special" that included a neglected orange grove.
So the Puhlicks went to Florida and drove down the driveway to
see their dream house. As luck would have it, Benny Demps and
Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 9 (testimony of N.J. Sen.
Raymond J. Lesniak).
222

22 3 Id. at 103 (testimony of Roberto M. Colon); Public Hearing Before the
N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, 60 (Sept. 27, 2006) (testimony of Kirk
Bloodsworth), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear
/dpsco92706.pdf Oast visited Nov. 8, 2007).

4 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24 at 103, 107-108 (testimony
of Roberto M. Colon).
22

22 5 Id. at 145 (testimony of Yvonne S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty
Study Comm'n).

226

Id. at 108.

Symposium, Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who
Deserves Death? 24 PACE L. REV. 107, 175-76 (2002) (citing Telephone
Interview with the Puhlick Family (Apr. 11, 1999)) [hereinafter Symposium].
22 7
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an accomplice had just robbed a house nearby, taken the safe to
an abandoned orange grove to open it, when unexpectedly the
Puhlick's car drove down that road. Demps pulled a gun, and
announced a stickup.
Mrs. Puhlick fumbling nervously for her wallet, dropped a
lipstick from her pocketbook. As she instinctively bent to
retrieve it, Demps shot her in the stomach. Demps forced Mr.
Puhlick to remove the spare tire from their car and climb back
in. Next he forced the real-estate agent cousin in. And finally,
Mrs. Puhlick, bleeding profusely, was forced into the trunk.
Demps slammed the trunk shut. And before he left that orange
grove, hearing the desperate cries of the three locked inside,
Benny Demps riddled the trunk with bullets, killing Mrs.
Puhlick and the cousin, both of whom absorbed bullets meant
for her husband, who lived to corroborate overwhelming
forensic evidence of Demps' guilt.
Eventually Demps was apprehended with the murder
weapon in the trunk of his car. 22 s The eyewitness identification
- not a fleeting glance but a sustained encounter - further
confirmed guilt beyond all shadow of a doubt. 22 9 Benny Demps
was a cold blooded, depraved murderer. And so a Florida jury
sentenced him to die. 23° But then in 1972 the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Furman, holding unconstitutional the death
penalty as administered across the country. 231 So the states
released into general population all condemned, including
Benny Demps.232
Now a lifer inside, Demps killed a fellow prisoner, perhaps a
prison "snitch."233 Because of his prior history, a Florida jury
again sentenced Demps to die. 234 The evidence was enough to
22

s Demps v. State, 272 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 1973).

22

9

2

3°

2 1

3

2 2

3

Symposium, supra note 227, at 176.
Demps, 272 So. 2d at 804; see also Symposium, supra note 227, at 176.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Demps v. State, 761 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 2000); see also Symposium,

supra note 227, at 176.
2

33

2 34

Demps, 761 So. 2d at 303.
Id.
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convict, barely. 2 35 This prison killing, in isolation, in my view
did not deserve death. His earlier murders however, did qualify
Benny Demps to die. And this time the People of Florida killed
him. 2 36
Suppose Demps, as he claimed, had not personally stabbed
the victim inside the prison?
Had Florida executed an
"innocent" man? Hardly. It may be politically incorrect to
declare, it may be legally incorrect, but morally not all
"innocence" is equivalent. David "Itchy" Brooks serves a life
sentence for a murder I believe he did not commit. But he
detailed to me many of the fifty-seven people he shot when he
was nineteen years old. 2 37 If Itchy had been executed for the
murder for which he serves a life sentence but likely did not
commit, Washington, D.C. would have executed an "innocent"
man who nevertheless deserved to die.
Other notorious street thugs around the country may have
been factually innocent of the particular murders for which they
were convicted. In Lorton Prison they used to say, "Maybe you
serve time not for what you have done all the time, but all the
time you serve, you serve for what you've done." 2 3s Whether or
not Demps stabbed that fellow prisoner to death, it defiles the
seriousness of innocence to claim, as the Commission witness
did, 2 39 that Florida executed an "innocent man." Killing a
murderer like Benny Demps was justice - at least poetic justice.
Executing the truly innocent horrifies us retributivists. We
must do nearly all we can to prevent it. "Abolishing the death
penalty will not ensure [that] no innocent person will be
convicted," the Commission conceded, "but it would ensure that
no innocent person will be killed by the State." 2 4° By parity of
235Id.
Rick Bragg, Florida Inmate Claimed Abuse in Execution, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2000, atA14.
2 36

2 37

Interview with David "Itchy" Brooks, Lorton, Va. (1986-1990).

2 38
Robert Blecker, Haven Or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison:
Experiences ofPunishment Justified 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1166 (1990).

39 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 107-8 (testimony of
Roberto M. Colon).
2

2 4°

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.

Fall2007

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 5:1

reasoning, abolishing life in prison could not ensure that no
innocent person will be convicted, but it would ensure that no
innocent person will be imprisoned for life by the state. Of
course, as the Commission report noted, not having executed
anybody in twenty-four years, 2 4 1 New Jersey surely has not
executed any innocent person during that period.
However grudgingly, abolitionist witnesses had to concede to
Commission members, that there has "not been an exoneration
of anyone who has been sentenced to death in New Jersey." 2 4 2
New Jersey's death row houses no factually innocent
condemned. 2 43 Nor did New York's, before the New York Court
of Appeals found a tiny part of its statute unconstitutional. 2 44
Nor does anybody on Oregon's death row even claim factual
innocence. 2 45
The point is, with well-funded defense counsel, and a
carefully designed and administered death penalty, we can be
nearly certain that the error rate will approach zero. But luck
counts, and people sometimes make mistakes. Life itself is risky.
We constantly measure and balance risks, including deadly risks
- rejecting most, but taking a few.
Suppose we further balance the risk of making irreversible
mistakes against the reward - the "penological interest" in
executing the worst of the worst, who the Commission finding
euphemistically calls "a small number of persons guilty of
murder." 2 46
2 41

Id. at 86.

2 4 2 Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 23 (testimony of Edward
J. DeFazio, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n).

43 Id.; Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 42 (testimony of
Robert Blecker).
2

44 See, e.g., People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Cahill,
809 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 2003); People v. Mateo, 811 N.E.2d 1053 (N.Y. 2004);
People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004); People v. Taylor, 747 N.Y.S.2d
318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002)).
2

2 45 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 42 (testimony of Robert
Blecker); Joshua Marquis, Department: Parting Thoughts: A Just Punishment,
62 OR. ST. B. BULL. 62 (2002).

2 46

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
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How much weight should we give to the mistake of keeping
alive those who most deserve to die? Most Commissioners
would give the justice of condemning to death those who
deserve to die no weight at all. Those who dismiss retributive
justice as revenge, or see it as an irrational psychological
curiosity, could never feel the "compelling" effect of death as
ultimate justice to offset any risk, however small.
And how much risk was there, really that New Jersey will
execute the truly innocent? What risk should we tolerate?
Abolitionists love to publicly press us proponents to quantify
"tolerable error." During my question-and-answer session,
Commissioner Segars demanded this:
"Sir, I just need to understand that what I hear you
say is that the execution of an innocent person is
the cost of doing business if you want to uphold
the death penalty? Yes, or no?" 2 47
"No.
The remote, remote possibility of the
execution of an innocent person is the cost of
doing justice. "248
"The point is innocent," Ms. Segars pressed.
"That's the point." 2 49
"[Your] children are innocent," this witnesses
replied, "and yet you will expose them to a risk of
death for your own convenience" 2 s0 by walking
with them in a double stroller down the street
where there is a slightly greater chance that a truck
will jump the curb and kill them. 2 s1
If we readily expose our own lives and those we love most to
an infinitesimal risk of death for the sake of momentary
convenience, surely for the sake of justice we should reluctantly
2
47 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 70-71 (testimony of
Yvonne S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n).

2 48

Id. at 71 (testimony of Robert Blecker) (emphasis added).

2 49 Id. (testimony of Yvonne S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study
Comm'n).

2 5°

Id. (testimony of Robert Blecker).

2 1

See id. at 70.

5
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expose convicted murderers we most despise to a tiny chance of
unwarranted death. 2 5 2
Reverend Howard used his prerogative as Chair firmly to
dismiss this comparison as "apples and oranges," and shut down
the discussion. 2 53
But these same folks, so eager to press us for some calloussounding quantifiable risk we are willing to take, themselves
avoid quantifying the real risk we should take in other serious
situations. What risk would they tolerate that we might
imprison for life a truly innocent person? Or consign to death
whole families because we decline to spend the extra money to
make our roads or autos safer?
By not balancing risks to maximize justice, not balancing
errors against each other, almost completely ignoring
retribution which should have been its central concern, the
Commission report begs the question and simply declares,
"executing a small number of persons guilty of murder" could
not "justify the risk of making an irreversible mistake." 2 54
Our concern goes well beyond those two or three dozen
factual innocents in the United States at one time or other
wrongly sentenced to death, although eventually released from
death row.
We include among those disproportionately
condemned, the hundreds of guilty murderers who landed on
death row although they did not deserve to die. Again, to greatly
reduce the number, this witness suggested refining the statute,
Instead, the
including elevating the burden of proof. 2 55
cumulative effect of the Commission's parade of exonerated
convicted criminals with tales of their "innocent" colleagues, 2 56
may have given undecided Commissioners a misimpression that
false condemnation of true innocents across the country is
252

Id.

2 53

Pub. Hearing, Oct.

2 54

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis added).

11,

2006, supra note 13, at 72.

2 55 Pub. Hearing, Oct. 11, 2006, supra note 13, at 67-69 (testimony of
Robert Blecker); Robert Blecker, A Road Not Considered, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. (forthcoming 2008).

Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 103 (testimony of
Roberto M. Colon).
2 56
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common, instead of an extraordinarily rare phenomenon
elsewhere and happily unknown in New Jersey during the
modern era.
In the end, issuing its sixth finding, the Commission's onesided report failed to discuss or measure, much less balance the
remote risk of executing an innocent against the certainty of
letting many live in prison who deserve to die. 257

FINDING (7)

THE ALTERNATIVE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT
IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY INSTITUTION WITHOUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE WOULD SUFFICIENTLY ENSURE
PUBLIC SAFETY AND ADDRESS OTHER LEGITIMATE SOCIAL
AND PENO LOGICAL INTERESTS, INCLUDING THE INTERESTS
OF THE FAMILIES OF MURDERVICTIMS. 2 58

If the state abolishes the death penalty, will life without
parole "sufficiently . . . address .. .legitimate . . . penological
interests"? 2s9
"[T]here is no such thing as closure. There can only be
justice," Commissioner Garcia had declared on behalf of victims'
families. 26° "My concern is, if the death penalty were to be
eliminated in the State of New Jersey, will these families truly
receive ... justice?"261
Abolitionist witnesses early in the hearings characterized life
without parole as "very dire punishment." 262 "My mother was
beaten, sodomized, tortured and finally strangled," an
abolitionist survivor testified. 263 "If the killer were given life
2

57

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 51-55.

2 58

Id. at 56.

2 59

Id. at 56.

6° Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 32 (testimony of Kathleen
Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n).
2

261

Id.

262

Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 48 (testimony Robert Del

Tufo).
2 63

Id. at 12 (testimony of Sandra Place).
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without parole, and I mean a true life sentence, I would not be
here." 2 64
But if that tortured victim could somehow watch what we do
to her rapist murderer - would she approve? How do they live,
those imprisoned for life who might otherwise deserve to die?
While this Commission hardly focused their attention on
whether and when death was undeservedly severe and thus a
disproportional response, retributivists insisting on "just
deserts" also force the opposite proportionality question into
debate: is death's substitute, life in prison, proportionately
unpleasant for the most callous, sadistic killers?
Legislators convinced that prison life is nearly unbearable,
that "life inside is worse than death," may abolish the death
penalty, erroneously imagmmg they have maintained
proportionality. An informed public, however, aware that
sadists who rape and torture children end up watching
television and playing ping pong may insist, that as
administered, life without parole destroys the "moral
proportionality" which only a death penalty can maintain.
Diverting attention from the quality of life inside prison to
the length of time spent inside, leading abolitionist witnesses
such as Professor Robert Johnson tried to heighten the hype
surrounding life without parole with artful but misleading
rhetoric: "A better name for this sentence might be death by
incarceration. "265
Yes, assuming society retains this punishment - Europe has
rejected it - those serving life without parole will die in prison.
But very few will die because of prison.
We all live, condemned to die, somehow, somewhere. Some
of us will die in old age in our sleep, or watching television.
Should we call this "death by sleep" or "death by television"? Or
is it simply where we die? "Death by home"; "death by
hospital." "Death by bowling alley"? "Death by incarceration."
Even Commissioner Garcia, who would have kept the death
penalty if only we administered it, embraced this powerful but
misleading rhetoric: "How can we assure survivors that, if we
2 64

26 s

Id. at 15.

Pub. Hearing, July 19,
Johnson) (emphasis added).

2006,

supra note 78, at 57 (testimony of Robert
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[substitute life in prison for death], they will really actually leave
that prison in a pine box and in no other way?" 2 66
The question of justice - whether life without parole is a
moral substitute for the death penalty - can be answered not by
focusing on where the vicious killers die, but how they live while
incarcerated.
This witness, almost alone, begged the Commission to turn
its attention from the length of the punishment to the quality of
the day-to-day experience for those serving life without parole:
"[I] urge you ... do not make your decision in a vacuum ....
You have an obligation to understand .. the quality of life for
those who serve life without parole." 2 67 We must determine
whether death-spared lifers constantly feel punished, and
whether their lives are made miserable inside.
The New Jersey Department of Corrections official website
boldly declares their own "mission:" To "ensure that all persons
committed to the state correctional institutions are confined
with the level of custody necessary to protect the public and that
they are provided with the care, discipline, training, and
treatment needed to prepare them for reintegration into the
community." 2 6s
Punishment?
It's not a part of the Department of
Corrections' officially stated mission. Nor was it in Tennessee,
or Oklahoma (or Illinois) where this witness spent days
documenting life inside maximum-security prisons, watching in
disbelief as mass murderers played softball, volleyball, ping
pong, and chess. How would surviving family members in New
Jersey feel if they knew that child-killers serving life spent much
of their days watching sporting events and soap operas on color
television?
Consistent with New Jersey's Administrative Code, and what
the Corrections public information officer assured me, my oral
testimony suggested that well-behaved prisoners serving life
266 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 47 (testimony of
Kathleen Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n).
26 7 Pub. Hearing, Oct.
Blecker).

11,

2006, supra note 13, at 45 (testimony of Robert

68N.J. DEP'T OF CORRS., MISSION STATEMENT, http://www.state.nj.us
/corrections/about_us/html/mission.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
2
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without parole in New Jersey, as in other states, could end up
inside an even less restrictive medium security prison. 2 69
"[You have] heard ... heart[-]wrenching testimony from the
victim's families, saying ... [i]f only you had life without parole .
. . [w]e could move on with our lives," this witness intoned. 2 7°
"Could they move on with their lives if they really understood
what the quality of life is for those who do actually serve life
without parole day[-] to[-] day? You owe it to yourself to find
that out." 2 71
After respectful but sharp questioning from Commission
members hostile to a retributive point of view, my live testimony
concluded: "[I] beg you, look into the conditions [of] life
without parole and [you may] realize it's yet a crueler hoax "
than a death sentence pronounced but never carried out. 2 72 At
this point, the Chair ended the exchange. 2 73
Apparently responding to my plea, in its final hearing, the
Commission sought assurance from the New Jersey Department
of Corrections that those serving life without parole do live a
tough life inside maximum-security prison. 2 74 "[C]an you tell us
what is the meaning of a sentence of life without parole?"
Commissioner Coleman asked James Barbo, Director of
Operations for the New Jersey Department of Corrections. 2 75
"One of the prior speakers indicated that in some jurisdiction[s]
- and he even suggested that he would expect the same to be
true in New Jersey - that persons sentenced to life without

Pub. Hearing, Oct.
Blecker).
26 9

2

7°

2006, supra note 13, at 46 (testimony of Robert

Id. at 47.

271

Id.

2 2

Id. at 56.

273

Id.

7

11,

Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006, supra note 58, at 56 (testimony of James
H. Coleman, Jr., Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n).
2 74

2 75

Id. at 56.
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parole virtually live under hotel conditions. Can you comment
on that?" 2 76
"[I] worked in New Jersey State Prison for [eleven] years,
and I wouldn't describe it at all as a hotel," the Operations
Director assured the Commission. 2 77 He continued:
I was in on a Sunday afternoon just to see how
things were going, and I was watching the mess
move for dinner. And I was standing in the
rotunda watching the units go by ... [a]nd they
were just taking that monotonous walk into the
dining hall to get their meal and to come back.
Their hair turned gray like mine did since I left.
But there is a very debilitating, monotonous
lifestyle in a prison. Yes, inmates have television
access, they have educational programs, we have
social services programs. But life at New Jersey
State Prison is very debilitating to inmates. 2 78
We all get older, at least those of us fortunate enough to live
out our lives. Our hair turns grey if we are fortunate enough to
keep it. Even as a metaphor, this hardly demonstrates that life
without parole is justice, or that life at New Jersey State Prison
is "very debilitating" to inmates. 2 79
"One of the witnesses came in earlier in our testimony, and
equated a life in prison as a day at the beach and volleyball
camp," Commissioner Segars said, stretching my testimony a
bit, but focusing the inquiry. 2 8° "And what other kinds of things
can you talk about in terms of their day-to-day existence?" 2 8 1

2 76

Id. at 58.

2 77

Id. at 58. (testimony of James Barbo).

78

Id. at 59.

2 79

Id. at 58.

2

Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006, supra note 58, at 61 (testimony of Yvonne
S. Segars, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n).
280

281

Id. at 61.
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"Well, there is recreation," the Operations Director replied
literally, "but there is no volleyball. I can tell you that. There is
the usual weight[-]lifting, basketball, that type of thing." 2 8 2
Next up at that final day's hearing, Gary J. Hilton, former
Warden at the New Jersey State Prison and one-time Acting
Commissioner, testified, "thoroughly endors[ing]" and repeating
Dr. Johnson's earlier "death by incarceration" trick, while
assuring the Commissioners that New Jersey State Prison was
extremely well-managed and extremely secure. 2 83 Retributive
death penalty proponents can readily concede safe, secure
prison management, yet have serious doubts that a prison
experience justly punishes vicious killers well-behaved once
inside.
Obviously, for abolitionist scholars and these ranking
Corrections officials, life without parole was punishment
enough. "I can personally think of nothing more horrific than
contemplating and enduring the process of growing old in a
maximum[-]security
prison,"
Hilton
assured
the
Commissioners. 2 84
Really? How about being raped, then tortured to death?
"[C]arefully review and consider what Dr. Johnson and I
have had to say about the realities of life in prison and dying in
prison," the former Corrections Commissioner closed his
testimony. 2 8s "I am confident that you will share my conviction
that true life without parole provides a real and powerful
measure of retribution. I thank you." 2 86 At least Hilton had
mentioned retribution, if only to assert that life in prison
satisfied it.
The Chair left little doubt that these Corrections officials had
done as they were asked: "The reason why we've invited you to
speak about this is to characterize, as best you can, life in prison
for the rest of your life. . . . Because it has been suggested by
2 82

28

Id. (testimony of James Barbo).

3Jd. at 64-65 (testimony of Gary J. Hilton).

28 4

Id. at 66.

2 8s

Id. at 67.
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Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006, supra note 58, at 67.
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previous witnesses that there is something of a less punitive
environment, and you're here today to correct that
impression." 2 87
"[T]here is real and powerful retribution in having an
individual spend the rest of their life and die in prison," insisted
Hilton. 2 88 "[I] wanted to drive that point home. That's what it
means, no ifs, ands or buts." 2 89
"I'd just like to add," said Director Barbo, "to me, the
punitive aspect is the confinement." 2 9°
Ranking corrections officers across the country typically
declare this to me. The Court punishes by sentencing. The
purpose of prison is not punishment. The prisoner goes to
prison as punishment, not for punishment. The punishment is
the loss of liberty through confinement.
Period.
And
confinement there would be. But these Corrections officials had
far from established that a life in prison was proportional
punishment for vicious killers who may deserve to die.
"I've spent hundreds of hours in five states now with video
cameras - [I've had] full access to document ... the daily life of
people who serve life without parole. . . . I haven't gone into
New Jersey [prisons]; I'm trying to," this witness had testified
earlier. 2 9 1
Unlike Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, D.C. and Illinois,
the New Jersey Department of Corrections repeatedly refused
me permission to interview prisoners, or bring in a video
camera, or extensively document life inside. They did, however,
allow me a brief tour of New Jersey State Prison, accompanied
by a phalanx of ranking staff, including the Administrator
herself, who did answer my questions, however curtly, as long as
I made no reference to any testimony before the Commission.
2
87 Id. at 72-73 (testimony of Rev. M. William Howard, Jr., Chairman, N.J.
Death Penalty Study Comm'n).

2 88

Id. at 73 (testimony of Gary J. Hilton).

28 9

Id. at 73.

2 9°

Id. at 72 (testimony of James Barbo).

Pub. Hearing, Oct.
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Although the Department knew my mission was to absorb
and assess the quality of daily "life inside" - perhaps
coincidentally - during my entire tour, which they scheduled
from eleven a.m. to one p.m., no prisoner was feeding in the
dining room they showed me, no prisoner was visiting, no
prisoner was exercising in the gym or outdoors in the yard on a
sunny spring day. As we walked down the prison corridors,
inmates spotting a group of ranking staff with a stranger among
them, pressed themselves against a wall to let us pass. Thus it
was impossible to get a feel for life inside.
But it should be stated: This maximum[-]security prison
facility itself did seem much less cheerful than most others this
witness has documented. Industry, the Administrator informed
me, has been removed from New Jersey State Prison, thus
diminishing the inmates' opportunity to spend their days
working outside their cells. The outdoor yard was broken into
smallish sections with a basketball court and weights, but no
track or volleyball court or softball field, often found in other
states' maximum-security institutions. No grass or flowers or
any greenery existed inside the prison for inmates to walk upon
or touch.
The exercise yard has been "concreted," the
Administrator explained, because prisoners were planting
weapons in the dirt.
The large gym lacked sports scenes painted on the walls of
some other facilities, although the dining hall was decorated
with large, well-painted murals. Small cells looked and felt
bleak, but color televisions did adorn them. And as the
Administrator (or Captain) informed me proudly, inmates
routinely did get to watch first-run movies, sometimes before
the public got to see them, piped in by the prison television
system. And they did get all sorts of goodies from the
Commissary.
Perhaps New Jersey State Prison, as former Warden Hilton
had testified before the Commission, was "[b]y its very nature ..
. a cold, dangerous and frightening environment." My brief tour
left me unable to evaluate that characterization.
One particular statement Hilton had made to the
Commission did seem at odds with everything prisoners and
staff had told me during thousands of hours inside maximumsecurity prisons in six states these past twenty-two years: "As
offenders age and become more infirm, they become more likely
targets of abuse and intimidation by the younger population.
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The prison culture has no respect or deference to its senior
counterparts. Older inmates are routinely strong[-]armed for
their meager personal assets - tobacco, hard candy, and
coffee." 2 9 2 Hilton recounted how older inmates, terrified, would
wait until the younger ones went to exercise before they felt safe
enough to take a shower, forfeiting their own recreation time. 2 93
While the Administrator pointedly refused to comment on
her predecessor's Commission testimony, she did flatly deny
that younger inmates routinely prey upon older ones. But
Hilton's unrebutted testimony may have had its intended effect.
Perhaps some Commissioners imagined a life without parole,
where today's vicious killers, years later, would have morphed
into elderly prisoners afraid to leave their cells, at last feeling the
terror they had inflicted years before on their own unwilling
victims, thus finally getting their just deserts. If Commissioners
did rely upon this testimony, they were almost certainly misled.
Overall, my quick tour did confirm that New Jersey State
Prison was no "beach club" and was seemingly less pleasant
than similar maximum-security prisons in other states so far
That tour, however, leaves unanswered essential
visited.
questions: Is life without parole proportionate punishment for
today's death-eligibles? Is it punishment enough?
Most disturbing, in New Jersey State Prison, as with every
maximum facility thus far visited, a well-behaved prisoner's
daily life inside in no way reflects the gravity of the crime
committed on the outside. Sentences inside the prison may vary
in length, but they are consciously uniform in intensity. As the
Administrator confirmed, convicted aggravated murderers
serving life without parole get the same privileges as car thieves
or any other inmate.
While disavowing any general mission to punish, the
Administrator conceded that prisoners were punished who
violated prison rules.
They would be placed in the
administrative segregation unit, deprived of privileges afforded
the rest of the prison population. But once again, this "deserved

Pub. Hearing, Oct. 25, 2006, supra note 58, at 66 (testimony of Gary J.
Hilton).
2 92

2

93Jd. at 71-72.
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punishment" had nothing whatsoever to do with the crime on
the outside for which the inmate did time.
Impatiently waiting for me to leave at the end of the tour,
offhandedly responding to my casual parting question, the
Administrator gave a most revealing answer. Many inmates not
serving life without parole, but with extended sentences for
serious but lesser crimes at New Jersey State Prison, become
eligible to transfer to less secure, ostensibly less restrictive
facilities, yet relatively few apply. Why? "They become used to
the structure, the routine, the security," the Administrator
explained with a touch of pride.
This brief tour revealed nothing to make me doubt an
inconvenient but essential truth: In a thousand ways every day,
aggravated murderers who otherwise deserve to die, but now
instead will live their lives inside without parole even under
present conditions, do feel pleasure, satisfaction and relief.
Everyday, like so many of us, they will watch the news, root for
their favorite sports teams on television, watch movies, read
books, play basketball, lift weights, and otherwise enjoy life's
simple pleasures - eat palatable food, marvel at cloud
formations, feel the warmth of the sun. In short, their lives
assume new meaning, offer new satisfactions - they laugh, they
cry, they hurt, they strive, they grieve. And celebrate.
Over-projecting a hellish life for lifers inside maximumsecurity prison, the Commission failed to consider their and our
"psychological immune system," as Professor Jeremy
Blumenthal calls it. 2 94 Well-known studies reveal that although
we might expect lottery winners to be ecstatic and maintain
their joy from sudden new wealth, while accident victims
permanently paralyzed live very despondent lives thereafter, it
turns out not to be. 2 95 Long term, people's sense of well-being,
their enjoyment of life returns to the status quo ante. 2 96 Selfreporting studies among these groups and others reveal the
nearly universal human tendency for "hedonic adaptation" with

2 94 See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of
Affective Forecasting, So IND. L.J. 155 (2005).

2

9s Id. at 167-168.

2

96 Id. at 168.
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the passage of time. 2 97 Long term, social and physical support
systems and other factors combine to lessen the impact of harsh
environments. 2 98 Studies of death row inmates show what my
own extensive interviews confirm - contrary to popular belief, a
"general sense of well-being" pervades this "new normal." 2 99
Obviously, however, the Commission believed the
Department's testimony that life spent inside New Jersey State
Prison is terribly harsh. Responding perhaps to this witness's
concerns of injustice from a too-pleasant life spend inside
prison, and his claim that death-eligible convicts, well-behaved
inside, could be transferred to even less punitive settings, the
Commission departed from standard practice across the United
States.
Ordinarily the executive branch - especially the
Department of Corrections - decides whether and when to
transfer a well-behaved lifer to a less restrictive setting. This
Commission, however, has recommended specific legislation,
perhaps from a sense of political appeal, or maybe from a sense
of justice, that would preclude the Corrections Department from
transferring a death-eligible prisoner sentenced to life without
parole to a less punitive setting: "Based on our findings, the
Commission recommends that the death penalty in New Jersey
be abolished and replaced with life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, to be served in a maximum security
facility ."3° 0
Meanwhile, many families of murdered victims will grieve
the loss of their loved ones. They and we, their fellow citizens,
feel haunted by the voices of these tortured victims, which call
out to us for a justice no longer even threatened. Patricia
Harrison counseled the Commission about the lasting effect of
her sister's murder upon her grieving family: "Walk in my shoes
or the shoes of the many living victims of this crime. Only then
could you experience the unfairness and grief caused by missing

2 97

2

Id. at 168-169.

9s Id. at 175.

2 99

Id. at 169.

3oo COMM'N REPORT,

supra note 1, at 67 (emphasis added).
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a loved one while having the knowledge that the killer continues
to enjoy life."3° 1

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION: A PERSON
CONVICTED OF [AGGRAVATED] MURDER SHALL BE
REQUIRED TO PAY RESTITUTION TO THE NEAREST SURVIVING
RELATIVE OF THE VICTIM.3° 2

The Commission took it upon itself, as it had every right to
do, to add this recommendation to their principal proposal to
abolish the death penalty and substitute life without parole in a
maximum-security facility - at present, the New Jersey State
Prison.3°3
Who could quarrel with the popular and politically expedient
recommendation to spend more money on victims' services?
But the Commission went beyond this.
Exactly how was a convicted aggravated murderer sentenced
to life without parole supposed to earn the money to pay the
victims' families inside New Jersey State Prison, which had shut
down industry? Prisoners pursue the very few jobs available,
which more than generating money for Commissary, also gets
them out of their cell. Would the Corrections Department
implement the Commission's recommendation by saving the
scarce, highly prized jobs for the worst killers, thus once again
perversely undermining retributivism? Or would they transfer
these aggravated murderers to facilities that offered better
employment opportunities?
Beyond its practical problems, the Commission's proposal
undermines fundamental moral principles of Western culture.
From earliest times, a victim's family responded to homicide.
They would retaliate if they could; or in lieu of that, they might
accept a "blood price" as a settlement, buying the killer peace
and the victim's survivors some measure of satisfaction.3°4
Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 19 (testimony of Patricia
Harrison).
3° 1

3° 2 COMM'N REPORT,

3o3

supra note 1, at 76.

Id. at 76-77.

3o4 See generally Blecker, Roots Resolving the Death Penalty: Wisdom
from the Ancients, supra note 208 at 180.
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All other pre-Biblical Near Eastern cultures allowed the
victim's family or the community to settle up, accepting
monetary compensation for their loss in lieu of punishment.3°s
Seemingly, moral guilt was irrelevant. The slayer was simply
worth more alive, perhaps as a slave - or by the Commission's
proposal, a lifer inside. For utilitarians it has always been about
costs and benefits. The blood price worked: no one complained,
and anyway, "why cry over spilt blood?" Just put it behind us,
profit from it, and move on.
Although the Old Testament favors defendants when it
comes to proving capital homicide, it changes tone when
punishing it, refusing to allow murderers to live, who deserved
to die: "These things shall be a statute and ordinance to you
throughout your generations," declared the Old Testament,
emphatically laying down the law.3°6 "[Y]ou shall accept no
ransom for the life of a murderer who is [guilty], [but he shall]
be put to death."3°7
Thus the ancient Hebrews recognized that money can never
truly compensate for murder. They also embraced its moral
corollary - that no property crime should be capital. By
refusing to allow the killer to buy his way out, the Old Testament
taught that individual human life is incommensurably valuable.
Life has no price: no amount of money given could ever equal
the value of an innocent life taken. Life was neither expressible
nor dischargeable in monetary terms. Justice shall not be
bought; the victim's family shall not be bought off.
"Accept no ransom"3os in lieu of the death penalty, Numbers
declares, "for blood pollutes the land, and no expiation can be
made ... , for the blood that is shed in it, except by the blood of
[him] who shed it. "309
At roughly the same time the Hebrews assembled the Bible,
the ancient Greeks, also repulsed by blood pollution rejected the
3osJd.
3° 6 Numbers

35:29 (New Revised Standard Version).

3o7

Numbers 35:31 (New Revised Standard Version).

30s

Id.

3o9

Numbers 35:33 (New Revised Standard Version).
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blood price, expressing the ultimate value of human life
concretely: the convicted murderer must die.3 10 In the spirit of
equal justice under law, both the ancient Hebrews and the
ancient Athenians decreed that nobody bought his way out of
homicide-no financial settlement. When it came to death as
crime and death as punishment, a single standard of justice
prevailed, based upon anger and mercy, but never money. The
ancients recognized that the dignity of the individual victim
demanded the death of the killer.
Thus Western Civilization advanced by abolishing the blood
price, and extending the death penalty to all who deserved it.
What can be said for those abolitionists today on the
Commission who claim human dignity as exclusively their own
concern, while they also propose their preferred option of life
without parole plus some direct monetary restitution from the
killer to the victim's family? Perhaps this recommendation
unconsciously gratifies the Commissioners' own primitive sense
of retribution - literally "payback." But the thought of grieving
families, especially poor ones, financially dependent upon and
grateful for periodic payments from their loved one's murderer,
strikes us more thoroughgoing retributivists as simply
retrograde.

CONCLUSIONS
A. STATE ABOLITION MAY PRODUCE FEDERAL EXECUTIONS

Important
decisions
usually
produce
unintended
consequences. If the state legislature abolishes the death
penalty, of course no one will be condemned to death or
capitally prosecuted under the revised statute. Increasingly,
however, the federal government prosecutes aggravated murder
under federal law, especially in those states without a death
penalty. Sometimes the local prosecutor, stripped of a capital
option under state law, turns to the federal government to seek
death federally. Recently in New York, for example, at the
initiation of the local prosecutor, a federal jury condemned

See Blecker, Roots Resolving the Death Penalty: Wisdom from the
Ancients, supra note 208.
3 10
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Ronell Wilson to death for murdering two local undercover
police officers.3 11
Thus, ironically, if the New Jersey legislature abolishes the
death penalty, the net effect, long term, may be to restore the
death penalty to New Jersey.

B. THE MORAL LOGIC OF LIFE WITHOUT PARO LE
At first glance, the underlying logic of life without parole
seems plausible enough: "the greater includes the lesser." The
community's greater power to kill its worst offenders necessarily
includes a lesser, but still awesome power to imprison them for
life without possibility of release.
Life without parole, however, is a very strange sentence when
you think about it. And the more you do think about it the less
stable becomes its moral support. While it may represent the
jury's unanimous second choice - of those who would condemn
the killer to die, and others who would leave open a possibility of
redemption from a life spent inside a prison - the punishment
itself seems at once too little or too much.
If a sadistic or extraordinarily cold, callous killer deserves to
die, then why not kill him? We ought to steel ourselves against
counting all potential future rehabilitation or remorse of the
most vicious killers. The past cries out and demands it.
But if we are unwilling to irrevocably extinguish the
personality of the condemned and the body that goes with it,
why should we - like Odysseus at the Mast - forever place it
outside of our own power to reassess? Why should we ignore
the rich, mature, constructive, vital human being that even the
most heinous killer may possibly become? If we are going to
keep the killer alive, why strip him of all hope?
So, while life without parole may be the closest moral
approximation states without a death penalty can reach, while
life without parole may also be the only unanimous compromise
verdict a bitterly divided jury can reach, and while life without
parole may be the ultimate sanction this Commission
recommends, still it does not feel exactly right.

311

Brick, supra note 164.
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True, by one logic, the greater includes the lesser. But then,
too, sometimes by doing less than we might we do more than we
may.

C. ABOLITION MAY EXTEND THE REACH OF LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE

Commissioner Segars, the Public Defender, while
"embracing" the Commission's primary recommendation to
abolish the death penalty, issued a separate statement opposing
the substitution of mandatory life without parole "in countless
cases in which the death penalty would never otherwise be
imposed."3 12 The Commission's proposal, the Public Defender
explained, will "inevitably captur[e] many cases that never
would have been prosecuted capitally or resulted in death
verdicts."3 13 Because "death is different,"3 1 4 states with a death
penalty provide super due process for everyone charged
capitally.3 1s This special care includes a separate penalty phase
where the jury weighs additional aggravating circumstances
against mitigating circumstances, after the state has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating
circumstance at trial.3 16 As the Public Defender points out,
under the Commission's recommended procedure, life without
parole becomes mandatory upon a finding of an aggravating
factor.3 1 7 The defendant can no longer offer mitigating factors,
and the sentencer no longer has discretion to reject the new
3 12 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 89 (statement of Yvonne S. Segars,
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring and dissenting in part).

31 3

Id. at 89.

314

People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 711 (N.Y. 2002).

3 1 s COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 89 (statement of Yvonne S. Segars,
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring and dissenting in part);
see also State v. Martini, 901 A.2d 941 (N.J. 2006); People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d
705 (N.Y. 2002).
316

Id.

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 89 (statement of Yvonne S. Segars,
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring and dissenting in part).
317
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ultimate penalty, based upon compelling circumstances of the
individual defendant.3 18
New Jersey already mandates life without parole for the
murder of police officers and children under fourteen during a
sexual assault.3 1 9 "To expand unnecessarily the categories of
cases in which discretion is totally removed from the sentencing
equation would be a grave mistake."3 20 The Commission's
proposed legislation, then, creates yet another significant
unintended consequence:
"The number of [additional]
defendants sentenced to life without parole will be far greater
than the number currently being sentenced to death."3 21 Thus,
as the Public Defender pointed out, if the Commission really
wanted to "replace" the death penalty with life without parole, it
should give the sentencer discretion to reject life without parole
even where an aggravating factor exists.3 22
The Public Defender was "particularly concerned" about the
potential for abuse in applying the "felony murder" aggravator,
which presently:
makes it a capital offense to commit a knowing
and purposeful murder during the commission of
robbery, burglary, sexual assault, kidnapping,
arson and carjacking. The vast majority of these
cases are not prosecuted capitally. Even when they
are, they infrequently result in death verdicts
because jurors attribute lesser weight to this
aggravating factor in relation to the mitigating
factors offered by the defendant. Mandatory
imposition of life without parole in every such case
is the most troublesome example of how the
Commission's proposed statute goes beyond the

318

Id.

31 9

Id. at 90.

320

Id.

321

Id.

3 22

COMM'N REPORT,

supra note 1, at 90.
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mere "replacement" of the death penalty with life
without parole.3 2 3
The Public Defender acknowledged prosecutorial "discretion
under the Commission's model not to seek life without parole in
certain cases even if aggravating factors apply to the alleged
facts. However, most of the factors that would typically weigh
against seeking the death penalty would be diminished with the
new system."3 2 4 It would be "easy" for prosecutors to seek life
without parole.3 2 s Under the proposed legislation, concerns
about extra trial and appellate costs, mitigating factors or a
jury's reluctance to impose death "would all disappear. The socalled sentencing phase would be a formality in almost every
[felony murder] case .... [T]he jury would have already found
the defendant guilty of murder, robbery and felony murder. In
reality, there would be no issue left to deliberate."3 2 6
Retributivists should heed the Public Defender's warning.
The Commission's proposal to abolish the death penalty and
substitute mandatory life without parole,3 2 7 apparently merciful,
really eliminates mercy in cases where it belongs. We who are
committed to proportionate punishment and individualized
justice should reject the Commission's morally indiscriminate
proposal to abolish the death penalty entirely. This witness, on
behalf of fellow retributivists committed to individualized
proportional justice, urged the Commission to morally refine the
death penalty, especially eliminating the felony murder
aggravator .3 2 8
In that same spirit, we join the Public Defender, whether or
not the death penalty is abolished, rejecting the merciless,
indiscriminate mandatory life without parole for all those
convicted of felony murder.
32 3

Id. at 9i.

324

Id.

32sid.
32 6

Id. at 91-92.

32 7 COMM'N REPORT,

supra note 1, at 2.
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D. THE SYMBOLIC VALUE OF DEATH: THE COURAGE TO
PERSIST

The lone, brief dissent by a former legislator and primary
drafter of New Jersey's current death penalty statute3 2 9 did more
harm than good, creating a false impression that all sides had
been represented either by the report itself, or in dissent. The
lone absentee at this witness's testimony,33° the dissenter
neither returned phone calls, nor reacted to my prepared
statement specially e-mailed to him after my testimony.
Essentially defending "his" statute,33 1 without really engaging
the Commission on its fundamental assumptions, he urged the
state to "face up" to the problems with the administration of the
current system without making a single specific proposal to
modify the current regime.33 2
Of all additional statements attached to the Report,
Commissioner Kathleen Garcia's separate concurrence333 pained
this retributivist most. Sometimes the most difficult splits are
with those who take all but the last step with you. An ardent
death penalty supporter in a more perfect world, during the
hearings Commissioner Garcia repeatedly made clear that she
had "as much compassion for these perpetrators as they had for
their unfortunate victim(s)."334 Nevertheless, given the longstanding bias of "liberal judges" especially on the state's highest
court,335 "[i]t has long been evident that the New Jersey
Supreme Court will continue to ensure that no person,
3 2 9 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 79-83 (statement of J. John F. Russo,
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, dissenting).

COMM'N REPORT, supra note

33°

1;

Pub. Hearing, Oct.

11, 2006,

supra note

13, at 1.
33 1 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of J. John F. Russo,
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n dissenting).

33 2

Id. at 82.

333 Id. at 93-96 (statement of Kathleen Garcia, Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty
Study Comm'n, concurring).
334

Id. at 94.

335Id.
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regardless of how horrendous the crime(s) committed, will ever
be executed."33 6 Thus, because judges would find some way to
refuse to enforce the law, and to end the endless "agony" of
victims families waiting for justice to be done, Ms. Garcia on
behalf of survivors' families voted to end this cruel "joke."337
Has she thrown in the towel prematurely? At least one death
penalty has fully cleared the state high court and seems ready to
proceed to execution of sentence.33 8 Ironically, New Jersey may
be the only state with lethal injection Constitutionally
empowered to administer it. On September 25, 2007 the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Kentucky case to consider
whether lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment
because it poses an unconstitutional risk of a too painful
death.339 In their petition for certiorari, the lawyers for the
condemned insisted that "without this court's intervention,
inmates in Kentucky and the rest of the states that carry out
lethal injections -- except New Jersey -- will die because the
Departments of Corrections are not adequately prepared to
reverse the effects of the chemicals. "34o Should the U.S.
Supreme Court rule in favor of the condemned in this case,
having already modified its lethal injection procedures, New
Jersey may be the lone state constitutionally able to execute
their condemned killers. If only they had the will.
Of course New Jersey's abolitionist Governor could step in to
prevent any execution, but he may not want to bear the political
price, content instead to stack the Commission with his
33 6

Id. at 93.

337

COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 94.

33 8 State v. Martini, 901 A.2d 941 (N.J. 2006); Robert Schwaneberg, Death
Penalty Evokes Anguished Debate, STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 14, 2006, at 18,
available
at http://www.sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2006
/Sept2006/storyo5.pdf.

339 Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006), cert. granted, 2007 WL
2075334 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 007-5439).

34° Petititon for writ of Certiorari, Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2007 WL
2781088, at *vi, *23 (U.S. July 11, 2007) p. vi, p. 23 (citing In re the Matter of
Readoption with Amendments of Death Penalty Regulations, 842 A.2d 207
(N.J. Super. 2004)) (emphasis added).
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abolitionist appointees. No one's tenure lasts forever. Many
victims' survivors still believe that justice will be done and
would retain the penalty to await the outcome.341 Why not await
a changing Governor and state high court that more nearly
reflect the will of the people on this issue, and in the meantime
move forward by morally refining the statute to focus more
narrowly on the worst of the worst?
Why prefer a system necessarily unjust in principle to
another presently unjust in practice?
Besides, we should recognize the great symbolic significance
of the death penalty, as this witness urged.34 2 The Public
Defender's separate statement acknowledged the "symbolic
meaning" specially attaching to life without parole, although in
fact, many other lifers will be ineligible for release until long
after they die.343 States such as New Hampshire tenaciously
cling to their death penalty yet execute no one.344 Why?
Because symbolic significance attaches when society's
representatives on a jury choose death. Prisoners have told me,
years later, how the jury declaration that they were not fit to live
still pains them.345
Other Commissioners ignored this witness's plea to count
the death penalty's symbolic significance. Commissioner Garcia
at least took it seriously, if only to reject it: "While Professor
Blecker[] . . . indicated the death penalty statute was of value
even if it is never carried out, there can be no sense of justice for

34 1 Pub. Hearing, July 19, 2006, supra note 78, at 52 Oetter from Marilyn
Flax, victim's survivor).

Pub. Hearing, Oct.
Blecker).
34 2

11,

2006, supra note 13, at 55 (testimony of Robert

343 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 90 (statement of Yvonne S. Segars,
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring and dissenting in part).
344 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (2007); Murder Cases Revive Doubts
About New Hampshire Death Penalty, THE UNION LEADER, July 17, 2007, at

BS.
345 See, e.g., Interview with Rick Smith, prisoner on Oklahoma's Death Row
in Lorton Central Prison, in Washington D.C. (Nov. 20, 2004).
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survivors if the sentence they receive and embrace, no matter
what that may entail, is never served."346
Alright.
Suppose for the foreseeable future, as
Commissioner Garcia insists, the courts will block executions.
Why not satisfy the desires of victims' families for real justice?
Why not attach special punitive conditions to daily life for those
Condemned? Day to day, really, keep the connection between
the monstrous crime and society's response. Design and
administer
a
separate
punitive
setting,
resembling
administrative segregation today - but no longer reserved for
those who violate prison regulations inside, however petty.
Extend punitive segregation to those who committed the most
vicious, callous and sadistic killings on the outside permanently.
Abolitionists, of course, have embraced the Commission's
report, trumpeting it as thoughtful and complete. Hopefully this
reply should raise real doubts if it does not convince honest
observers that the Commission majority, abolitionist and antiretributive, conducted hearings and filtered evidence to beg the
question: is justice served specially and uniquely by killing those
who most deserve to be condemned?
A majority of the people of New Jersey feel that justice
requires a death penalty.347 Simply ignoring the popular will,
however, a few days after the November 2007 elections,
legislative leaders announced they would act on the
Commission's report, complete "unfinished business" and rush
abolition through a lame duck legislature by January of 2008.34 8
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of Kathleen Garcia,
Comm'r, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm'n, concurring).
34 6

347 Pub. Hearing, Sept. 13, 2006, supra note 24, at 68 (testimony of Patrick
Murray).
34 8 Tom Hester, Abolishing N.J. Death Penalty to get Lame Duck
Treatment, NEWSDAY, Nov. 11, 2007, available at http://www.newsday.com

/news/localjwire/ne~ersey/ny-bc-nj--legislativeprevie1111nov11,o,1502919.

story (last visited Nov. 13, 2007). See also, Elise Young, N.J. death penalty
be
history,
RECORD,
Nov.
9,
2007,
available
at
could
http://www.northjersey.com/page.php?qstr=eXJpcnk3ZjczN2Y3dnFlZUVFeX
k2MDcmZmdiZWw3Zjd2cWVlRUV5eTcyMTkoODkmeXJpcnk3ZjcxN2Y3dnFl
ZUVFeXky (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
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New Jersey would become a "beacon on the hill," abolitionists
proclaimed, and a model for other states.349 Perhaps, instead,
the people might press their representatives someday to really
consider the question, refine the statute, and punish with death
only those who most deserve to die.

349 Tom Hester, N.J. to Vote on Abolishing Death Penalty, WASH. POST,
Nov.
9,
2007,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/11/09/AR20071109013oi.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2007).

